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What will happen after Heller? We know that the Supreme Court will
no longer tolerate comprehensive federal prohibitions on home handgun
possession by some class of trustworthy homeowners for the purpose of,
and perhaps only at the time of, self-defense. But the judiciary could push
further, if nothing else by incorporating Heller’s holding into the
Fourteenth Amendment and enforcing it against states and municipalities.
In fact, the majority opinion offered little guidance for future cases. It
presented neither a purely originalist method of constitutional
interpretation nor a constraining doctrinal framework for evaluating other
regulation—even while it gratuitously suggested that much existing gun
control is acceptable. In the absence of more information from the Court,
we identify plausible legal arguments for the next few rounds of litigation
and assess the stakes for social welfare.
We conclude that some of the most salient legal arguments after Heller
have little or no likely consequence for social welfare based on available
data. For example, the looming fight over local handgun bans—an issue
on which we present original empirical data—seems largely
inconsequential. The same can be said for a right to carry a firearm in
public with a permit. On the other hand, less prominent legal arguments
could be quite threatening. Taxation and regulation targeted especially at
firearms might be presumptively disfavored by judges in the future, along
the lines of free speech doctrine. This could have serious consequences.
In addition, Second Amendment doctrine might generally dampen
enthusiasm for innovative regulatory responses to the problem of gun
violence. The threat of litigation may inhibit policy experimentation
ranging from micro-stamping on shell casings, to pre-market review of gun
design, to so-called personalized firearms, and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION
Judicial opinions on supreme law, no matter how backward-looking
their reasoning may appear, are occasions to look forward. They indicate
the position of today’s judges on issues faced by other institutions, and they
signify commitments that these judges are most unwilling to revise. On the
other hand, no opinion can fully chart the future path of judicial doctrine any
more than regulatory, statutory, or constitutional text can provide undisputed
guidance to all readers. Each of these texts must be used by decisionmakers
in the future. In fact, the identity of the relevant decisionmakers is bound
to change over time, with no guarantee that the new group will mimic the
judgment of the old.
Our goal is to consider the plausible future of gun regulation after
District of Columbia v. Heller,1 without forgetting the limits on accurate
1.

128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
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predictions. Heller itself decided little about the Second Amendment’s
scope and the appropriate method by which judges should test for its
violation. The majority opinion establishes that a certain class of
trustworthy citizens has a judicially enforceable right to an operable
handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense—perhaps only at the
time of self-defense—as against a flat federal ban on handgun possession.2
The holding leaves many questions undecided. Nor was this case the best
test of judicial courage. Opinion polls showed large national majorities
opposing such bans.3 Equally telling, a majority of United States Senators
and House members signed an amicus brief arguing that the District’s
regulations were unconstitutional.4 Thus the political environment intimated
little resistance to the narrow outcome in Heller.5 After 50,000 words of
argument, counterargument, and apparent compromise, the justices
delivered little more than a new beginning for Second Amendment
arguments in court.6
Understanding the hazards of prediction in these circumstances, we
take a social welfare perspective on gun control as our point of departure.
Our interest is in policy that best serves the overall welfare of the public,
including both gun owners and those at risk from gun-related crimes and
accidents. We care about judicial decisions that advance or retard such
policymaking, but we are less concerned with evaluating the Supreme
Court’s work according to conventional standards of legal argument or an
ideal theory of constitutional interpretation. We would investigate the social
welfare consequences of judicially enforceable gun rights even if these
rights were plainly dictated by justified fidelity to the true meaning of the
Constitution, and even if such rights ought to be understood as trumps to
any further cost-benefit analysis.7
Although this social welfare perspective is wide-ranging in some
respects, it leads us to significant and perhaps surprising conclusions about
2.
See infra Part II.A (discussing readings of Heller’s holding).
3.
See Lydia Saad, Shrunken Majority Now Favors Stricter Gun Laws, GALLUP NEWS
SERV., Oct. 11, 2007, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/101731/Shrunken-Majority-NowFavors-Stricter-Gun-Laws.aspx.
4.
See Brief for Amici Curiae 55 Members of United States Senate, the President of the
United States Senate, and 250 Members of United States House of Representatives in Support of
Respondent, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008). One might ask why these
legislators did not prefer to legislate. See infra note 243.
5.
Neither major party candidate for president took issue with the outcome after the fact,
see http://2008central.net/2008/06/26/mccain-and-obama-statements-on-dc-v-heller, although it is
worth noting that John McCain signed the aforementioned amicus brief while Barack Obama did
not, see Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 4, at 39.
6.
See infra notes 133–136 (collecting examples of litigation in Heller’s wake).
7.
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153, 153, 158,
165–66 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
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the future of sound gun control policy. To be sure, some of the
constitutional questions emerging after Heller will be relevant to good
public policy. The majority’s list of “presumptively” valid regulations will
have to be confirmed,8 and its view of Second Amendment rights might be
extended to state and local governments. These legal questions are obvious
and worth debating. But certain Second Amendment issues that are likely to
be litigated in the near future might be largely irrelevant to social welfare.
An example is the looming fight over state and local handgun bans—an
issue on which we present some original empirical data—and the possibility
of a qualified Second Amendment right to carry a firearm in public with a
permit. On the other hand, certain legal questions that have received less
public attention might have much higher stakes from a social welfare
perspective. An example is the validity of firearms taxes or safety programs
developed especially for firearms. Finally, Heller might be used to dampen
enthusiasm for innovative responses to the ongoing clash of gun rights
advocates and gun control proponents. We will briefly discuss this concern,
along with a faint hope for a better result.9
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. Part I offers some data on gun
ownership in the United States and a sketch of the country’s gun control
regime before Heller. Part II explains what was decided and left open by
the majority’s opinion, and discusses various models that the Supreme Court
has used tomodulate supreme judicial review in other fields. Part III
considers potential consequences of continued judicial oversight of firearms
regulation. Much of the analysis is provisional. But we can suggest danger
zones where aggressive judicial intervention would most likely result in
troubling consequences for social welfare, as well as disputes that seem
unimportant based on current knowledge. The analysis closes with a brief
discussion of the potentially complex relationship between judicial review
and innovation in gun control.

8.
Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817 & n. 26; infra text accompanying note 125.
9.
This Article relies on many empirical studies. They will be unfamiliar to most lawyers,
and some readers might wish to minimize the studies’ value for constitutional decisionmaking.
Indeed, the facial plausibility of the data might be influenced by the reader’s feelings about gun
control. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of SelfDefense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2008). But for our purposes, these empirical studies are
essential. We have made best efforts to accurately recount the findings thereinand to draw only
logically supportable conclusions therefrom. The data will not, however, perfectly measure the
psychological or emotional impact of gun rights and gun ownership. The happiness, satisfaction,
fear, and distress arising from the prevalence of guns in America is difficult to measure precisely.
Note also that judicial understandings of constitutional rights can influence the rendering of
ordinary law. Statutory interpretation may be influenced by constitutional doubt, and Heller might
instigate new constitutional doubt when courts interpret statutes. We set aside the difficult project
of predicting and estimating these effects after Heller.
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GUNS, RISKS, AND REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES10

Gun Ownership

In America, gun ownership is concentrated. Our best estimate is that
there are 200–250 million firearms in private circulation,11 meaning that
there are nearly enough guns for every adult to have one. But about
seventy-five percent of all adults do not own any guns.12 Recent survey data
suggests that about forty percent of males, about ten percent of females, and
about thirty-five percent of all households have at least one gun.13 It seems
that the prevalence of gun ownership by household has been in long-term
decline,14 partly because households are becoming smaller and less likely to
include an adult male. On the other hand, most people who own one gun
own many. In 1994, about seventy-five percent of all guns were owned by
those who owned four or more, and this slice of gun owners amounted to
only ten percent of the adult population.15
Firearms ownership is not only concentrated but also associated with
particular geographic locations and socioeconomic traits. The prevalence of
10.
This Part draws on material from Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Social Costs of
Gun Ownership. 90 J. PUB. ECON. 379 (2006).
11.
This estimate is based on two sources: federal tax records on sales and a survey. First,
the number of new guns added each year is taken from tax data kept by the federal government on
manufactures, imports, and exports. The annual count of net additions can be cumulated over, say,
the last century, with some assumption about the rate of removal through such mechanisms as offthe-books exports, breakage, and police confiscation. See GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS:
FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 63–64 (1997); Philip J. Cook, The Technology of Personal
Violence, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1–71 (Michael Tonry ed., 1991). The
second basis for estimating the stock is the one-time National Survey of the Personal Ownership of
Firearms (NSPOF), conducted in 1994. This is the only survey that has attempted to determine the
number of guns in private hands. A number of other surveys, including the General Social Survey,
provide an estimate of the prevalence of gun ownership among individuals and households but do
not attempt to determine the average number of guns per gun owner. The NSPOF estimate for the
number of guns in 1994 was 192 million, a number that is compatible with the “sales
accumulation” method, assuming that just fifteen percent of the new guns sold since 1899 have
been discarded or destroyed. See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Aiming for Evidence-Based Gun
Policy, 25 J. POL. ANAL. & MAN. 691, 699–700 (2006). Since the NSPOF survey, the annual rate
of net additions to the gun stock has been about 4–5 million per year, see BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO & FIREARMS, FIREARMS COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2002); BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, FIREARMS COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2001)—or 50–
60 million by 2006. Given a continued removal rate of just one percent, the stock as of 2006
would be about 220 million.
12. See PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS OF A
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF GUN OWNERSHIP AND USE 24 (1996).
13. See id. at 24, 54.
14. See id. at 9; TOM W. SMITH, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE REGULATION OF
FIREARMS 1 & fig. 2 (2007).
15.
See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 12, at 13–14, 32.
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gun ownership differs widely across regions, states, and localities, and
across different demographic groups. For example, while it appears that
about thirteen percent of Massachusetts households own a gun, fully sixty
percent of Mississippi households own one.16 Residents of rural areas and
small towns are far more likely to own a gun than residents of large cities,
partly because of the importance of hunting and sport shooting in those
communities. And this geographic skew is consistent with a concentration
of ownership among middle-aged, middle-income households.17 These
attributes are associated with relatively low involvement in criminal
violence,18 and it is reasonable to suppose that most guns are in the hands of
people who are unlikely to misuse them. Still, gun owners as a group are
more likely than other adults to have a criminal record.19
Of the subset of Americans who own firearms, handguns are somewhat
popular but by no means the dominant type of weapon. Around thirty-three
percent of America’s privately held firearms are handguns, which are more
likely than long guns to be kept for defense against crime.20 In the 1970s,
about thirty-three percent of new guns were handguns, a figure which grew
to nearly fifty percent by the early 1990s and then fell back to around forty
percent.21 Despite the long-term increase in the relative importance of
handgun sales, a mere twenty percent of gun-owning individuals have only
handguns; forty-four percent have both handguns and long guns, reflecting
the fact that most people who have acquired guns for self-protection are also
hunters and target shooters.22 Less than fifty percent of gun owners say that
their primary motivation for having a gun is self-protection against crime.23
Most Americans get their guns from regulated dealers, but a significant
number of acquisitions are either less regulated or criminal. The majority of
guns in circulation were obtained by their owners directly from a federally
licensed firearm dealer (FFL).24 However, the thirty to forty percent of all
16.
See D. Azrael, Philip J. Cook & Matthew Miller, State and Local Prevalence of
Firearms Ownership: Measurement, Structure, and Trends, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY
43 (2004).
17.
See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 15, at 53–55.
18.
See Ching-Chi Hsieh & M. D. Pugh, Poverty, Income Inequality, and Violent Crime: A
Meta-Analysis of Recent Aggregate Data Studies, 18 CRIM. JUSTICE REV. 182, 198 (1993)
(showing a correlation between poverty, income inequality, and violent crime); Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Crime in the United States 2007 (table 38), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_38.html (indicating that only about 23% of violent
crimes are committed by people between ages 30 and 50).
19.
See id. at 35.
20.
See id. at 14–16, 37–39.
21.
See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2000) (dating the decline at 1997).
22.
See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 15, at 53.
23.
See id. at 56.
24.
See id. at 31.
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gun transfers that do not involve licensed dealers—the so-called secondary
market25—accounts for most guns used in crime.26 Despite the prominence
of gun shows in contemporary policy debates, the best available evidence
suggests that such shows account for only a small share of all secondary
market sales.27 Another important source of crime guns is theft. Over
500,000 guns are stolen each year.28
B.

Gun Violence

Including homicide, suicide, and accidental deaths, 30,694 Americans
died by gunfire in 2005. This amounts to a gun-related mortality rate of
10.4 deaths per 100,000 people for the year.29 The mortality rate is down
substantially from 1990, when it was 14.9 per 100,000, but is still much
higher than the observed rate in, say, 1950.30
Intentional violence is the major exception to the general decline in
death by injury during the last fifty years.31 More Americans die each year
by gun suicide than gun homicide.32 However, more people suffer nonfatal
gun injuries from crime than from unsuccessful suicide attempts. The case
fatality rate, which is much higher for attempted suicide than for gunshot
wounds from criminal assaults, accounts for this difference. In addition,
800 people per year die from unintentional gunshot injuries, although this
figure is heavily influenced by coroners’ standards concerning what
constitutes an accident as opposed to a homicide or suicide.33
Although everyone shares in the costs of gun violence to some extent,
the shooters and victims are not a representative slice of the population. In
25.
See Philip J. Cook, Stephanie Molliconi, & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59 (1995).
26.
See JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A
SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 4 (expanded ed. 1994); JOSEPH F. SHELEY & JAMES D.
WRIGHT, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: YOUTH, GUNS, AND VIOLENCE IN URBAN AMERICA (1995); Philip
J. Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and Investigative Uses
of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 277, 291–92 (2001).
27.
See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 15, at 25 tbl. 3.11.
28.
See id. at 41; KLECK, supra note 11, at 90.
29.
See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention &
Control,
WISQARS
Fatal
Injuries:
Mortality
Reports,
available
at
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate.html (accessed Sept. 8, 2008) [hereinafter
WISQARS].
30.
See PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS 18–19 (2000);
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ED. & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 77–78
(1950), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsus/VSUS_1950_3.pdf.
31.
See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 30, at 21–27.
32.
See CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS
REPORTS—DEATHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2006, at 20 (2008), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_16.pdf.
33.
See id. at 19, 37.
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2005, the gun homicide victimization rate for Hispanic men ages 18–29 was
six times the rate for nonHispanic white men of the same age.34 And the
gun homicide rate for black men ages 18–29—99 per 100,000—was a
remarkable twenty-four times the rate for white males in that age group.35
In addition, there appears to be considerable overlap between the
populations of potential offenders and victims: the large majority of both
groups have prior criminal records.36 The demographics of gun suicide look
somewhat different.
While suicides and homicides both occur
disproportionately among those with low incomes or educational attainment,
gun suicides are more common among whites than blacks, and more
common among the old than among young or middle-aged adults.37 Men
are vastly overrepresented in all categories.
However, the costs of gun violence to society are more evenly
distributed across the population than victimization statistics might suggest.
The threat of being shot prompts private citizens and public institutions to
undertake a variety of costly measures to reduce this risk, and many people
live with anxiety arising from the lingering chance that they or a loved one
could be shot. As one local district attorney notes, “Gun violence is what
makes people afraid to go to the corner store at night.”38 As a result, the
threat of gun violence in some neighborhoods is an important disamenity
that depresses property values and economic development. Gun violence,
then, is a multifaceted problem that has notable effects on public health,
crime, and living standards.
While quantifying the magnitude of these social costs is difficult, one
contingent-valuation (CV) survey estimate found that the costs of gun
violence were on the order of $100 billion in 1995.39 Most of these costs
($80 billion) come from crime-related gun violence.40 Dividing by the

34.
See WISQARS, supra note 29.
35.
See WISQARS, supra note 29.
36.
See David M. Kennedy, Anne M. Piehl & Anthony A. Braga, Youth Violence in Boston:
Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 191 tbls. 1 & 2 (1996); Michael D. McGonigal et al., Urban Firearm Deaths: A Five-Year
Perspective, 35 J. TRAUMA 532 (1993); Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Anothony A. Braga,
Criminal Records of Homicide Offenders, 294 J. AMER. MED. ASSN. 598 (2005); see also Don B.
Kates, Jr. & Daniel D. Polsby, The Myth of the “Virgin Killer”: Law-Abiding Persons Who Kill in
Fit
of
Rage
19–20
(2000)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.hoffmang.com/firearms/kates/Myth_of_the_Virgin_Killer-Kates-Polsby.pdf.
37.
See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 30, at 23–24.
38.
J. Kalil, A New Approach: Prosecutors Take Aim at Gun Crimes, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Mar. 9, 2002, at 1B.
39.
See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 30, at 11.
40.
See id. at 10
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annual number of crime-related gunshot wounds, including homicides,
implies a social cost per crime-related gun injury of around $1 million.41
C.

Gun Regulation by Ordinary Law

While far less stringent than regulation in other wealthy nations,42 state
and federal law in the United States regulates most aspects of firearms
commerce and possession. It should be noted up front, however, that gun
regulation in the United States is almost entirely a product of legislation
rather than rulemaking processes in administrative agencies. The latter
would tend to place greater demands on the decisionmakers to solicit
alternative viewpoints and to show a serious consideration of costs and
benefits. The legislative process tends to have no such formal requirements
before enactment.
1.

Interstate Transactions and Access Restrictions

A primary objective of federal gun regulation is to minimize policy
spillover across state lines. The balance between benefit and cost in gun
possession and regulation differs widely across states. Federal law aims to
ensure that stringent regulations on firearms commerce in some states are
not undercut by relatively lax regulation in other states.43 The citizens of
rural Montana understandably favor a more permissive system than those
living in Chicago, and both can be accommodated if transfers between them
are effectively limited. In response to such concerns, the Gun Control Act
of 196844 established the framework for the current system of controls on
41.
See Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, The Benefits of Reducing Gun Violence: Evidence
From Contingent-Valuation Survey Data, 22 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 207, 213–14 (2001). This
estimate is intended to capture the costs of gun misuse and so ignores the benefits to society from
widespread gun ownership—in the same way that studies of the social costs of automobile
accidents ignore the benefits from driving. The figure comes, in part, from CV responses about
what people say they would pay to reduce crime-related gun violence by 30 percent. One potential
concern is that these estimates assume that societal willingness to pay to reduce gun violence is
linear with the proportion of gun violence eliminated, which may not be the case. And in practice
there remains some uncertainty about the reliability of the CV measurement technology. In any
case, most of the estimated costs of gun violence to the United States appear to come from crime,
insofar as suicide is treated as a private concern, and the estimated costs of gun crime by COOK &
LUDWIG, supra note 30, at 10–11, fits comfortably next to more recent CV estimates for the social
costs of crime more generally. See M.A. Cohen et al., Willingness-to-Pay for Crime Control
Programs, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 89 (2004).
42.
See DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 2–3 (2004).
43.
See Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 133 (1975).
44.
Pub. L. 90-351, tit. IV, § 902, 82 Stat. 226 (June 19, 1968) & Pub. L. 90-618, tit. I,
§ 102, 82 Stat. 1214 (Oct. 22, 1968), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–930 (2008).
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gun transfers. All shipments of firearms, including mail-order sales, are
limited to federally licensed dealers. These dealers are required to obey
applicable state and local ordinances and to observe certain restrictions on
sales of guns to out-of-state residents.45
In addition to controlling regulatory spillover between states, federal
law establishes a national regulatory floor of restrictions on the acquisition
and possession of guns. Thus the Gun Control Act specifies several
categories of people who are denied the right to receive or possess a gun,
including illegal aliens, people convicted of a felony or an act of domestic
violence, people under indictment, illicit drug users, and those who have at
some time been involuntarily committed to a mental institution.46 In
addition, federally licensed dealers may not sell handguns to people younger
than age 21, or long guns to those younger than 18.47 And dealers are
required to ask for identification from all would-be buyers, have them sign a
form indicating that they are not within a proscribed category, and initiate a
criminal history check.48 Finally, dealers are required to keep a record of
each completed sale and to cooperate with authorities when they need to
access those records for gun-tracing purposes.49
Notably omitted from federal regulation are gun sales by people not in
the business. Such sellers, whether at a gun show or elsewhere, may
transfer a gun without keeping a record of sale or performing a background
check.50 This private sale loophole is a major gap in federal regulation and
helps the used gun market thrive.
State regulation provides another layer of restrictions on transfer,
possession, and use of firearms. Eleven states require handgun buyers to
obtain a permit or license before taking possession, a process that typically
entails a fee and a waiting period.51 All but a few such transfer-control
systems are permissive, however, in that most people are legally entitled to
obtain a gun. In the few permitting and licensingjurisdictions that do not
have permissive standards, including Massachusetts and New York City, it
45.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)-(e) (2008). The McClure-Volkmer Amendment of 1986 eased
the restriction on out-of-state purchases of rifles and shotguns. Id. at §§ 922–923. Such purchases
are now legal as long as they comply with the regulations of both the buyer’s state of residence and
the state in which the sale occurs.
46.
See id. § 922(d)(4).
47.
See id. § 922(b)(1).
48.
See id. § 922(d).
49.
See id. § 922(s); LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE REPORT, REGULATING
GUNS IN AMERICA: AN EVALUATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND
SELECTED LOCAL GUN LAWS 145–48 (2008) [hereinafter LCAV REPORT]; Jon S. Vernick &
Stephen P. Teret, A Public Health Approach to Regulating Firearms as Consumer Products, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (2000).
50.
See 18 U.S.C § 921(a)(21)(C) (2008).
51.
See LCAV REPORT, supra note 49, at 162–63.
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is difficult to obtain a handgun legally. Chicago (since 1982) and
Washington, D.C. (since 1976) largely prohibited handgun ownership as a
matter of formal law—although the District’s handgun ban cannot be
enforced in all circumstances after Heller.52 State legislatures have enacted
a variety of more modest restrictions on firearms commerce as well. For
example, Virginia, Maryland, and California limit dealers to selling no more
than one handgun a month to any one buyer.53
2.

Gun Design

Federal law also imposes some restrictions on gun design, and certain
types of firearms are effectively prohibited. The National Firearms Act of
1934 (NFA)54 was intended to eliminate Prohibition-era gangster firearms,
including sawed-off shotguns, hand grenades, and automatic weapons
capable of continuous rapid fire with a single pull of the trigger.55 All such
weapons had to be registered with the federal government and transfers were
subject to a tax of $200, which at the time of enactment was confiscatory.56
While some of these weapons have remained in legal circulation, the
NFA—now amended to ban the introduction of new weapons of this
sort57—appears to have been quite effective at reducing the use of automatic
weapons in crime.58
Furthermore, the Gun Control Act of 1968 included a ban on the
import of small, cheap handguns,59 sometimes known as “Saturday Night
Specials.” This ban uses criteria to assign points to a gun model depending
on its size and other qualities.60 Handguns that fail to achieve a minimum
score on the factoring criteria, or that fail to meet size and safety criteria,
cannot be imported. However, domestic manufacturers may lawfully
assemble guns, often from imported parts, that would fail the factoring
52.
See infra Part II.A–II.B. On the District’s revised rules, see note 113, below.
53.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1207(a)(9), (c)(6), 12071(b)(7)(F) (2008); MD. CODE ANN.,
PUB. SAFETY § 5-128(a)-(b) (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.3:2(P) (2008); see also
LCAV REPORT, supra note 49, at 140–41.
54.
26 U.S.C §§ 5801–5872 (2008).
55.
See id. § 5845 .
56.
See id. § 5811.
57.
See id. § 5861.
58.
See GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA 67–70 (2005).
59.
An important loophole allowed the import of parts of handguns that could not meet the
“sporting purposes” test of the Gun Control Act. This loophole was closed by the McClureVolkmer Amendment of 1986. See Zimring, supra note 43, at 155; Philip J. Cook, Mark H.
Moore, & Anthony A. Braga, Gun Control, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME CONTROL 291
(James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2002).
60.
See Zimring, supra note 43, at 156; TRUDY A. KARLSON & STEPHEN W. HARGARTEN,
REDUCING FIREARM INJURY AND DEATH: A PUBLIC HEALTH SOURCEBOOK ON GUNS 74 (1997)
(listing some of the factoring criteria for imported guns).
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criteria. This market niche has been well supplied. One study found that
one-third of new domestically manufactured handgun models did not meet
the size or quality requirements applied to imports.61
In 1994, Congress temporarily banned the importation and manufacture
of certain assault weapons (military-style semi-automatic firearms). The
Crime Control Act62 banned nineteen such weapons by name, and others
were outlawed if they possessed some combination of design features such
as a detachable magazine, barrel shroud, or bayonet mount.63 The Act also
banned manufacture and import of magazines holding more than 10
rounds.64 However, then-existing assault weapons and large-capacity
magazines were grandfathered.65 And in 2004, the ban was allowed to
expire.66
Aside from these design prohibitions, federal law has been permissive.
It leaves unregulated those types of firearms that are not specifically banned.
Furthermore, firearms and ammunition are excluded from the purview of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission.67 Nor is there any federal agency
with responsibility for reviewing the design of firearms, or any mechanism
in place for identifying unsafe models that could lead to a recall and
correction.68
But some states have acted independently. In 2000, the Massachusetts
Attorney General announced that firearms would henceforth be regulated by
a state agency with jurisdiction over other consumer products, and firearms
judged unacceptable would be taken off the market.69 Massachusetts is
unique in asserting broad state authority to regulate gun design and safety
per se, though a handful of other state legislatures have restricted the design
of new guns in more limited fashion. The first important instance occurred
in Maryland, which enacted its own ban on Saturday Night Specials. The
legislature was responding to a successful suit against a gun manufacturer.
61.
See John S. Milne et al., Effect of Current Regulations on Handgun Safety Features, 41
ANN. EMERG. MED. 1 (2003); see also GAREN WINTEMUTE, RING OF FIRE: THE HANDGUN
MAKERS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 11–17 (1994).
62.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994).
63.
See id. § 110102.
64.
See id. § 110103(b)(A).
65.
See Christopher S. Koper & Jeffrey A. Roth, The Impact of the 1994 Federal Assault
Weapon Ban on Gun Violence and Outcomes, 17 J. QUAN. CRIM. 33, 36 (2001).
66.
See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, § 110105 (1994).
67.
See Vernick and Teret, supra note 49, at 1196.
68.
See RICHARD J. BONNIE, CAROLYN FULCO & CATHARYN T. LIVERMAN, REDUCING
THE BURDEN OF INJURY: ADVANCEMENT AND TREATMENT 126 (1999).
69.
The new rules effectively ban Saturday Night Specials and require that handguns sold in
Massachusetts include childproof locks, tamper-proof serial numbers, and safety warnings. The
new gun safety regulations affect manufacturers as well as retailers. See MASS. CODE REGS. ch.
940, § 16.01-09 (2008).
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In exchange for relieving manufacturers of small, cheap handguns from
liability, the legislature created a process for reviewing handgun designs and
specifying which models would be ruled out due to size and safety
concerns.70 As of 2008, eight states have some version of a ban on Saturday
Night Specials71 California has also been active in recent years, instituting a
ban on assault weapons and establishing a number of handgun safety
requirements.72
3.

Gun Possession and Use

States and some localities also specify the rules under which guns may
be carried in public. Every state except Vermont and Alaska places some
restriction on carrying a concealed firearm.73 However, the trend over the
past several decades has been to ease restrictions on concealed carry,
replacing prohibition with a permit system and easing the requirements to
obtain a permit. Currently, in most states adults who are entitled to possess
a handgun can obtain a permit to carry after paying a fee.74
In addition, there has been some effort to regulate firearms storage.
Since 2005, federal law has required all handguns sold by licensed dealers to
come equipped with a secure storage device.75 As well, eleven states and
the District of Columbia have laws concerning firearm locking devices.76
Massachusetts and the District require that all firearms be stored with a lock
in place.77 And the Maryland legislature recently adopted a pioneering
requirement: All handguns manufactured after 2003 and sold in that state
must be “personalized” with a built-in locking device that requires a key or
combination to release.78
4.

Record Keeping

Some gun regulations are designed to assist law enforcement in solving
crimes. In particular, federal law requires that all licensees in the chain of
commerce—manufacturers, distributors, retail dealers—keep records of
70.
See MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE ANN. § 5-405 (2008); see also Jon S. Vernick et al.,
Effects of Maryland’s Law Banning Saturday Night Specials on Crime Guns, 5 INJ. PREVENTION
259 (1999).
71.
See LCAV REPORT, supra note 49, at 218.
72.
See id. at 220–21.
73.
See id. at 208.
74.
See id. at 203; JOHN R. LOTT JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME
AND GUN CONTROL LAWS 43 (2000).
75.
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(z) (2008).
76.
See LCAV REPORT, supra note 49, at xvi.
77.
See id. at 226.
78.
See MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE ANN. § 5-132 (2008).
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transfers and provide them to law enforcement for tracing purposes.79 For
example, if a police department confiscates a firearm that may have been
used in a crime, they can submit a trace request through the National
Tracing Center of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF), which will attempt to trace the chain of commerce using
the serial number and other characteristics of the gun. If all goes well, the
retail dealer who first sold the gun will be identified and will supply
information from the form that the buyer filled out. This system is
inefficient and error-prone, and even if successful usually leaves the
investigators far short of the information they really want: the identity of the
most recent owner of the firearm.80 But a more direct system of national
registration has been politically impossible to implement, except in the case
of weapons of mass destruction.81
A few states do have registration requirements, however. California
requires registration of handgun transactions, even if they occur between
private parties.82 This requirement complements a new regulation that all
semiautomatic pistols sold in the state after 2010 be designed with microstamp capability. Microstamping means that the firearm will print the serial
number, make, and model of the gun on the shell casing when the gun is
fired.83 Shell casings are ejected from pistols and often left at the scene,
where they can be collected by investigators and, under the new law, used to
initiate a trace even when the gun itself is not in custody.
5.

Mass Tort Litigation

Thus far, our regulatory review shows a baseline of federal legislation
with a second layer of state legislation that varies significantly across the
country. In its best light, this policy diversity shouldreflect different values
and circumstances in different locations. Yet much differentiation in the
cost-benefit balance for gun control occurs within states, at the local level.
Residents of heavily populated cities tend to suffer relatively high rates of
violent crime and have little interest in gun sports, while the reverse is true
in rural areas and small towns. As a result, the most extreme gun control
measures tend to be adopted by cities rather than states.84 But this degree of

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g).
See Cook & Braga, supra note 26, at 301.
See National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–5872 (2008).
See Cal. Penal Code § 12072(d).
See id. § 12126(b)(7).
See EVALUATING GUN POLICY 363, 367 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds. 2003).
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decentralized policymaking is often thwarted by state law: over forty states
preempt at least some local law affecting firearms.85
In the 1990s, several cities facing tremendous costs from gun-related
crime tried an alternative. Frustrated by their inability to change gun
regulations through legislation, they filed mass tort lawsuits that might have
imposed higher standards of conduct on the gun industry. These suits
asserted unsafe and defective gun design under state law,86 or claimed that
the industry was creating a public nuisance through failure to police the
supply chain by which guns were marketed and often found their way into
dangerous hands.87 These suits were inspired by, and had parallels with, the
lawsuits against the cigarette industry filed by state attorneys general. The
cigarette manufacturers ultimately settled those suits, agreeing to restrictions
on marketing practices and to $240 billion in damages paid out over twentyfive years.88 One difference is that most of the plaintiffs in the gun industry
suits were cities rather than states. Another difference is that the firearms
industry is much smaller and more diffuse than the tobacco industry, so the
financial stakes were much lower. Indeed, the primary motivation for the
municipal plaintiffs was probably not money damages, but forcing the gun
industry to assume greater responsibility for reducing the damage done with
its products.
In any event, the cities’ arguments did not fare well in court. A case
brought by New Orleans, for instance, was halted by the Louisiana Supreme
Court after that state’s legislature enacted a statute barring such suits.89 Of
the city lawsuits, the “great majority have been dismissed or abandoned
prior to trial, and of the few favorable jury verdicts obtained by the
plaintiffs, all but one have been overturned on appeal. A handful of claims
have been settled prior to trial.”90

85.
See James A. Beckman, Preemption Laws, in GUNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW 478 (2002).
86.
See Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 5–6 (La. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 951 (2001).
87.
See City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004); Brian J.
Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Roadmap for Reforming Gun Industry
Misconduct, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (1999); see also Jon S. Vernick & Stephen
P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms: Tort Litigation Against Firearm
Manufacturers and Constitutional Challenges to Gun Laws, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1713, 1746–49
(1999). Thirty other cities and counties filed suits against the gun industry, claiming negligence in
marketing practices, product design, or both. See generally Timothy D. Lytton, Introduction: An
Overview of Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 1–35 (Timothy D.
Lytton ed., 2005).
88.
See Milo Geyelin, States Agree to $ 206 Billion Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23,
1998, at B13.
89.
See Morial, 785 So.2d at 6.
90.
Lytton, supra note 87, at 5.
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Then, on October 26, 2005, President George W. Bush signed the
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).91 It provided an
important degree of legal immunity to the firearms industry, while
preserving the possibility of traditional tort actions against the industry. For
example, injuries from defects in design or manufacture can be compensated
in private suits. But the industry is now exempt from liability for injuries
resulting from criminal misuse of its product. While PLCAA might itself be
subject to constitutional challenge,92 efforts to enhance gun regulation
through litigation have failed for the most part. And today the litigation
opportunities are running in the opposite direction.

II.

HELLER AND THE NEXT LITIGATION FRONTIER

As of 2007, there was little else to say about the general character and
dynamics of gun control policy. Certainly federal constitutional litigation
was a matter of minimal significance. For most of our country’s history, the
Second Amendment was absent from the Supreme Court’s agenda. When
arguments based on the amendment reached the Court, they were
ineffectual. In the late 1800s, the Court confirmed that the amendment
could not be used to challenge state regulation.93 And in 1939, United
States v. Miller94 concluded that the federal government was free to restrict
possession of sawed-off shotguns.95 Miller seemed to link Second
Amendment rights to state organized militias, rather than to individual
preferences about gun ownership. Lower federal courts followed this notion
and the amendment was a dead letter in litigation.96
Attraction to Second Amendment arguments gained strength in other
contexts, however. The gun rights movement made the amendment a
central rhetorical element in its organizing efforts.97 Many lawmakers were
91.
92.

18 U.S.C. § 922(z) (2008).
See Timothy D. Lytton, Afterward: Federal Gun Industry Immunity Legislation, in
SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 87, at 339–54.
93.
See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 553 (1876).
94.
307 U.S. 174 (1939).
95.
See id. at 178 (seeking evidence that a sawed-off shotgun “has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”).
96.
See, e.g., Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710–11 (7th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1116 (2000). Results from litigation involving state constitutions were not
dramatically different. State supreme courts invoked state gun rights to invalidate only a few state
regulations after World War II. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105
MICH. L. REV. 683, 716–26 (2007).
97.
For a view of the gun rights movement, political institutions, and Heller, see Reva B.
Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Comment: Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008).
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sympathetic. And by the late twentieth century, scholarship on the
amendment was booming.
Some legal academics supported an
understanding of federal gun rights beyond anachronistic state militias.98
There were also judicial rumblings. In 1997, Justice Thomas suggested that
the amendment might have provided another basis for invalidating the
Brady Act’s mandate that local officials conduct background checks on
handgun purchasers.99 In 2001, a federal appeals court declared that the
Second Amendment included a personal right to keep and bear arms
unrelated to militia service, although the court upheld the regulation at
issue.100 The United States Department of Justice then amended its
litigation position and endorsed the lower court’s logic.101
A.

Heller’s Demilitarized Message

In 2008, the Supreme Court changed its message, too. District of
Columbia v. Heller102 became the first successful Second Amendment
challenge in the Court’s history—a full 207 years after the amendment was

98.
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637
(1989); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an AfroAmericanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under
Fire: The New Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996); Eugene
Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998). For contrary
views from historians, see SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING
FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006); Jack N. Rakove, The Second
Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND
HISTORY 74, 113 (Carl T. Bogus ed. 2000) (“[I]t is completely anachronistic to expect the
disputants of the eighteenth century to have comprehended, much less addressed, the problem of
firearms regulation in its modern form.”). On competing theories for the gist of the Amendment’s
meaning, see MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE
BATTLE OVER GUNS (2007).
99.
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938–39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(joining the majority opinion, which relied on federalism principles, but pointing to a Second
Amendment argument).
100.
See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a
conviction for gun possession while subject to a domestic violence restraining order), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 907 (2002).
101.
See Memorandum from the Attorney General to All United States Attorneys Regarding
United
States
v.
Emerson
(Nov.
9,
2001),
available
at
www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/emerson.htm. When Emerson sought review in the Supreme
Court, the Solicitor General abandoned the militia-related view of the amendment. See Brief for
the United States in Opposition to Certiorari 20 n.3, in United States v. Emerson, 536 U.S. 907
(2002) (accepting, however, “reasonable restrictions designed to prevent possession by unfit
persons or to restrict the possession of types of firearms that are particularly suited to criminal
misuse”).
102.
118 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
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ratified.103 This time lag between ratification and adjudication must have
mattered to the decision. Because however much attention the Court’s
opinion paid to the circumstances of 1791, crucial features of the majority
opinion bend to developments that occurred long after. At the end of the
day, the opinion begins the process of accommodating an individualistic gun
rights vision to the modern tradition of gun regulation.
The case involved a police officer who wanted to keep an operable
handgun in his home and to “carry it about his home in that condition only
when necessary for self-defense.”104 But the District was an urban
jurisdiction where the gun rights movement enjoyed little success in
ordinary politics. One District law prohibited possession of handguns by
private citizens with only narrow exceptions.105 A second regulation
required all firearms to be either unloaded and disassembled or triggerlocked at all times.106 Exceptions were made for law enforcement officers,
places of business, and otherwise lawful recreational activities,107 but the
regulation reached people’s homes. A third regulation involved firearms
licensing by the chief of police.108 The Heller majority left unaddressed the
issue of firearms licensing, but it concluded that the first two regulations
infringed this plaintiff’s right to have a handgun in his home for selfdefense.109
It is quite possible to read the majority opinion for very little. The
justices did not commit to restraining state or local firearms laws,110 which is
where much of the regulatory action takes place. Furthermore, the
plaintiff’s position in Heller was relatively strong. The regulations under
attack were fairly broad; the argument came down to a qualified right to
handgun possession in the home, and the dissenting justices thought the
amendment was not even implicated without a militia connection.111 Even
under these circumstances, the gun rights position only narrowly prevailed
on a 5–4 vote. Perhaps a slightly different case would fracture the majority
coalition. After all, it does not take special courage to oppose flat handgun
bans.112 One can at least imagine the 5–4 vote going the other way had the
103.
For an analysis of such time lags, see Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration
Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 17) (estimating the average lag
between formal amendment and Supreme Court interpretation at forty years).
104.
Heller, 118 S.Ct. at 2788 & n.2 (relating the lower court’s understanding).
105.
See D.C. Code § 7-2502.01.
106.
See id. § 7-2502.02.
107.
See id.
108
See id. § 22-4506.
109.
See Heller, 118 S.Ct. at 2819 (regarding licensing).
110.
See id. at 2812–13 & n. 23.
111.
See id. at 2823, 2847.
112.
See supra notes 3–4 (citing polling and majority congressional opposition to flat
handgun bans). There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of judicial behavior which
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District permitted a law-abiding citizen to store one handgun in the home,
but required handgun training, registration, and a trigger lock—except when
and if self-defense became necessary.113
Nevertheless, more significant lessons might be drawn. The first
notable feature of the majority opinion is the virtual irrelevance of militias
to its view of gun rights. The text of the Second Amendment begins with
the preface, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, . . . .” Whether or not this assertion is factually accurate, it could
serve an important role in understanding the words that follow: “the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” But for the
majority, the amendment’s preface cannot be used to either limit or expand
the meaning of the subsequent words when read separately.114 Instead, the
militia reference is supposed to indicate the purpose for codifying a
preexisting right of “the people” in general to keep and bear arms.115
Although the amendment’s ratification did follow a debate over standing
armies and the ability of state militias to check centralized tyranny, the
Heller majority contended that the codified right to keep and bear arms also
was valued for self-defense.116 This more personal self-defense function,
not the prerequisites of a robust citizen militia, defines the scope of the right
in Heller.
Fencing off the amendment’s judicially enforceable right from its
militia-oriented preface is revealing—and it cuts in two directions. Some of
the implications point toward judicial intervention. Private parties are now
allowed to raise Second Amendment arguments in court without showing
any relationship to a militia, state-run or otherwise. The content of the right
is personal and nonmilitary. As well, incorporation of Second Amendment
norms into the Fourteenth Amendment might seem easier once the content
of the former is separated from the preservation of state militias. If the right
is not about federal-state relations, it better resembles the individual rights

we will not delve into here. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 257 (2005). The classic view of the Court as sticking close to national governing coalitions
is Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
113.
For a discussion of the District’s first temporary legislative reaction to Heller, which
allowed registration of handguns (excluding semi-automatics) for in-home self-defense (after a
ballistics test) and allowed trigger locks to be removed when the owner reasonably feared
imminent harm in the home, see Del Quentin Wilber & Paul Duggan, D.C. Is Sued Again Over
Handgun Rules, WASH. POST, July 29, 2008, at B01. The District’s second round of temporary
legislation can be found at Second Firearms Control Emergency Act of 2008, available at
http://mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/frames.asp?doc=/mpdc/lib/mpdc/info/pdf/2ndFirearmsControl_Act.pdf.
114.
See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2792–97 & nn. 3–4.
115.
See id. at 2800–02.
116
See id. at 2817–18.
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the Court has been willing to enforce against state and local governments
through the Fourteenth Amendment.117
But another implication involves judicial restraint. Ignoring the
practical needs of decentralized citizen militias allows courts to reject
libertarian demands for exceptionally potent firepower and to preserve the
modern role of government in law enforcement and national defense. The
Heller majority is not about to enforce any asserted right to frighten the
United States Armed Forces with overwhelming firepower. The majority’s
portrayal of the Second Amendment right seems, at most, tangentially
related to people protecting themselves from the risks of centralized
tyranny.118 Instead, the majority’s conception of the right is mainstreamed
and demilitarized. In this respect, one can say that Heller defanged the
Second Amendment for litigation purposes.
B.

Heller’s Core Right and Suggested Limits

What, then, is the judicially enforceable right recognized in Heller?
The answer is debatable. Different readers will see the matter differently in
the absence of additional direction from the justices regarding what they
meant (or mean) to do. To make progress, however, we can look for
Heller’s minimum plausible content. We can attempt to describe the core
right to which a majority of justices seem clearly committed.
Whatever else it might be made to include, the majority’s core right
involves self-defense with a typical handgun in one’s home. These justices
were not interested in a right to carry arms “for any sort of confrontation,”119
and declared that “self-defense . . . was the central component of the right”
codified in the amendment.120 And in explaining why the District’s handgun
ban was defective, the majority stressed the confluence of three factors: selfdefense, handguns, and homes. It asserted that an inherent right of selfdefense has been central to the understanding of the Second Amendment in
American history, that handguns are now commonly chosen by Americans
for lawful self-defense, and that people’s homes are where “the need for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”121 For similar reasons,
the majority immunized the plaintiff’s handgun from the District’s
requirement that firearms in the home be kept inoperable at all times.122
117.
See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
PREMISES 499–507 (3d ed. 2006) (reviewing selective incorporation).
118.
See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817.
119.
Id. at 2799.
120.
Id. at 2801.
121.
Id. at 2817.
122.
See id. at 2818 (referring to “the core lawful purpose” of self-defense).
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Hence the majority’s core conception of the right seems to contemplate
a law-abiding citizen with a functional handgun in his own home for the
purpose of defending it, and perhaps only at the time of attack.123 This
notion of the right was strong enough to overcome an outright prohibition
on possessing a functional handgun in one’s own home at any time. And
this description of the right matches the situation of the actual plaintiff in
Heller, who asked to store an operable handgun in his home and to carry it
there only when necessary for self-defense.
In fact, limits were a theme in the majority opinion. These justices
went out of their way to suggest insulation for several forms of gun control
not at issue in the case. They conceded that the Second Amendment right is
“not unlimited,”124 and offered a list of “presumptively lawful regulatory
measures.”125 In crude terms, this nonexhaustive list includes regulation
aimed at (1) atypical weapons, (2) abnormal people, (3) sensitive locations,
(4) sales conditions, (5) safe storage, and, perhaps, (6) concealed carry.
Although the matter is not free from doubt, it appears that these
presumptively valid regulations would withstand a Second Amendment
objection even to the extent that they apply to handgun possession in the
home for self-defense.
Otherwise Heller’s core right would seem
“unlimited” in ways that the majority did not mean.
Thus the majority sought to protect weapons “typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens” for self-defense in the home,126 asserting that a
limitation to weapons in common use is consistent with a tradition of
restricting “dangerous and unusual weapons.”127 Handguns are thereby
covered in view of their current popularity in the market,128 while the
majority strongly suggested that machine guns, M-16s, and sawed-off
shotguns are not.129 We do not know the extent to which regulation may
validly influence which weapons become common. Such influence was
implicitly tolerated by the Heller majority because the mix of weapons
purchased in contemporary America is partly a function of the tax and
regulatory policies discussed in Part I. In any event, a right restricted to the
type of weapon owned by the mainstream of armed home-defenders fits
with the majority’s demilitarized vision of the amendment.
The discussion of other presumptively valid regulation was even more
brief: “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See id. at 2788, 2822.
Id. at 2816.
Id. at 2817 & n. 26.
Id. at 2815–18 (emphasis added).
See id. at 2817.
See id. at 2818.
See id. at 2815, 2817.
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prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms.”130 Later, in distinguishing founding era
regulation of gun powder storage, the majority said its logic did not suggest
problems with “laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent
accidents.”131 Finally, the majority observed that most nineteenth-century
cases had upheld prohibitions on concealed weapons.132
The opinion is, nevertheless, a litigation magnet. On the same day that
Heller was decided, suit was filed against the city of Chicago arguing that
the Heller right must be enforced against state and local action.133 In
another suit raising the incorporation question, gun show owners are using
Heller to challenge Alameda County’s law against guns on county
property.134 And New York City is now defending its handgun permit
system, which critics argue is too demanding and grants excessive discretion
to the police department.135 Some criminal defendants are even objecting to
the federal machine gun ban and felon in possession convictions, despite the
list of presumptively valid regulations in Heller.136 And some jurisdictions
are avoiding the costs and risks of litigation by repealing their handgun bans
without a fight over incorporation.137 In early 2009, San Francisco followed

130.
Id. at 2816–17.
131.
Id. at 2820.
132.
See id. at 2816. On unconcealed pistols, see Part III.C, below.
133.
The Second Amendment Foundation maintains a website dedicated to the case:
www.chicagoguncase.com. Plaintiffs are challenging Chicago’s handgun ban, see CHICAGO
MUNI. CODE §§ 8-20-040(a),-050(c) (noting exceptions), as well as the city’s requirement that
firearms be registered before acquisition and then re-registered annually, see id. §§ 8-20-090(a),200. However, Chicago law seems to differ from the District of Columbia’s regime at issue in
Heller, in that Chicago does not appear to mandate a trigger lock on all firearms in the home at all
times. Whether any such difference will influence litigation outcomes remains to be seen.
134.
The case, Nordyke v. King, is pending in the Ninth Circuit as of this writing. The oral
argument
is
available
at
http://www.cspanarchives.org/library/index.php?main_page=product_video_info&cPath=18_19&products_id=
283468-2&highlight=.
135.
See Daniel Wise, Defense Lawyers Fire First Shot in Challenge to State Gun Law, N.Y.
L.J., vol. 240, July 16, 2008, at1.
136.
These arguments have not been successful in lower federal courts, however. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gilbert, 286 Fed. Appx. 383, 2008 WL 2740453, at *2 (9th Cir. July 15, 2008)
(unpublished disposition), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 613 (2008); United States v. Whisnant, 2008 WL
4500118, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2008) (No. 3:07-CR-32) (collecting cases); see also Adam
Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. __, __–__ (2009) (manuscript at 14–17) (analyzing
post-Heller lower court cases).
137.
See Deborah Horan, Evanston Latest Suburb to Repeal Handgun Ban in Wake of High
Court
Ruling,
CHICAGO
TRIB.,
Aug.
12,
2008,
available
at
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-gun-ban_13aug13,0,1421061.story. Prevailing plaintiffs
may recover their attorneys fees from state and local defendants in federal constitutional litigation,
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this course. It settled a gun rights lawsuit by agreeing to eliminate a lease
provision for public housing tenants that prohibited storage of firearms and
ammunition.138 The question is how the legal uncertainty will shake out.
C.

Models for Judicial Review After Heller

Even with the majority’s laundry list of presumptively valid regulations
in hand, there is no obvious theory by which to better specify the listed
items or to add new items. Remember that the list is neither conclusive nor
exhaustive. Is the list governed by historical analogies and traditional police
powers? Can it be built into a general principle allowing “reasonable”
regulation? This is unsettled. Nor did the majority identify a generic test
that one should apply to determine whether the Second Amendment is
violated. Providing such guidance is not a requirement for case law and it
can be difficult to do well in a single decision, but the absence of a
prescribed test leaves regulators guessing.
One possibility is that the Court will fashion additional rules based on
history and analogy. After all, the Heller majority devoted thousands of
words to an analysis of historical sources. These justices indicated that they
were investigating the ordinary meaning of the amendment’s words to
ordinary citizens in 1791.139 Whatever version of originalism was on
display, it was the predominant mode of argument for the majority. In
addition, the majority rejected case-by-case balancing of competing interests
within the perceived “core protection” of the Second Amendment.140 In
contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent advocated judicial balancing and
considered much more than founding-era firearms regulation.141 The
majority responded, “whatever else [the amendment] leaves to future
evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”142
but prevailing defendants normally cannot. See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH NORMAN,
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 442–64 (2001).
138.
See Stipulation Regarding Settlement and Dismissal, Doe v. San Francisco Housing
Auth., Case No. CV-08-03112 TEH (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2009) (continuing to prohibit unlawful
firearms
and
ammunition
possession),
available
at
http://volokh.com/files/sfpublichousingguns.pdf.
139.
See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2788, 2810. On different versions of originalism, see Samaha,
supra note 103, at 35–37.
140.
Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2821.
141.
See id. at 2847–68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142.
Id. at 2821; see also id. (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were
understood to have when the people adopted them . . . .”). Of course a right’s originally
understood scope, to the extent that any such meaning was determinate within the relevant
population at the relevant time, could include consideration of circumstances that may change and
authorization of future decision makers to adjust in light of those changes.
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There is no hint here of judges asking whether a challenged regulation is
justified by cost-benefit analysis or supported by reliable data.
But other facets of Heller indicate the Court is not locked into strong
and rule-oriented originalism. As for hard-line rules over flexible standards,
the majority’s repudiation of case-specific interest balancing was done with
reference to the “core protection” recognized in Heller.143 Perhaps the
majority’s inflexibility begins and ends with this core right, while some
brand of judicial cost-benefit analysis would be appropriate elsewhere, at
least at the periphery of Second Amendment values. As for originalism, it
was not the only form of analysis on display. Founding-era historical
sources were not used and probably cannot explain certain critical junctures
in the majority opinion.
Most notably, the majority’s list of presumptively valid firearms
regulation was not supported with serious originalist investigation. In fact,
the list was not supported with much of any argument. It is quickly
becoming one of the most important features in the majority opinion, yet its
foundation is far easier to locate in contemporary political consensus or
perhaps the necessity of pragmatic compromise in building a five-vote
coalition on the bench than it is to support with eighteenth-century
regulatory examples. Equally important, the majority relied on sources far
removed from 1791.
Heller’s rendition of nineteenth-century
characterizations of the Second Amendment stretched to include sources
postdating ratification by nearly 100 years.144 These citations help us
understand postenactment traditions much better than they can reveal any
settled meaning at the founding. Using tradition to inform constitutional
doctrine is also consistent with the majority’s reference to “longstanding”
gun control in its preferred list,145 with its claim that the District’s ban was
more burdensome than others in history,146 and with its reliance on an
extended practice of prohibiting unusual weapons.147 While such analysis
does involve history and analogy, it is a departure from strong and pure
originalism.
Judge-centered traditions played a role in the majority opinion as well.
For example, the majority claimed that the District’s handgun ban flunked
“any of the standards of scrutiny that we [judges] have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights.”148 But no one asserts that these standards
are dictated by originalism alone. They are tests that courts developed to
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.
See, e.g., id. at 2811–12.
Id. at 2816.
See id. at 2818.
See id. at 2817.
Id.
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implement constitutional norms.149 The majority also made the effort to
reconcile their historical conclusions with the Court’s meager case law
regarding the Second Amendment,150 which was unnecessary if only
originalist history mattered. And the majority cautioned that nineteenthcentury precedent indicating that gun rights are not enforceable against state
action “did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry
required by our later cases.”151 Hence neither strong originalism nor strict
rule-like doctrine have been locked into place by Heller—surely not in the
long run, possibly not for cases outside of the core right now recognized,
and perhaps not for the process of defining limits on that core right. Only
by word count is the Heller opinion dominated by originalism.
If we are correct, then the majority exhibited dependence on history
without prescribing any particular model for judicial review of Second
Amendment claims over the long term. And there is no consensus model
that judges could import from other fields of constitutional adjudication.
The truth is that judicial review is not a binary choice. Turning it on does
not determine exactly how it should be performed. Instead, making judicial
review operational requires choices along several dimensions, and it
implicates fundamental questions about the judicial role.
The first choice is whether any judicial oversight will take place. Some
clauses of the written Constitution are never litigated (for example, many
provisions involving the structure of Congress) or are not enforced by courts
(for example, certain issues of impeachment).152 Some clauses were
enforced against ordinary politics in one era only to be largely ignored in
another (for example, the Contracts Clause).153
Among those constitutional norms that courts are comfortable
enforcing, judges have developed a variety of practices. Some domains are
filled with founding-era history and analogical reasoning (for example,
federal jury trial rights).154 Other domains turn to longstanding tradition for
guidance (for example, strands of substantive due process).155 Many others
are dominated by judicial precedent and analogical reasoning (for example,

149.
For a catalog of doctrinal tests developed by courts in constitutional cases, see RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
150.
See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2808–09.
151.
Id. at 2813 n. 23; see also id. at 2791 (“Some have made the argument, bordering on the
frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second
Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way.”).
152.
See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
153.
See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 606, 642 (2008).
154.
See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
155.
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–22 (1997).
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speech and abortion rights).156 Some combine precedent, originalist history,
and contemporary interest balancing (for example, search and seizure
jurisprudence).157
Even when common law development of constitutional doctrine
predominates, diversity reappears. Some justices value specific doctrinal
rules over the flexibility of more open-ended standards, while others exhibit
the opposite preference.158 The intensity of judicial review also varies.
Sometimes the Court organizes its thinking around several tiers of scrutiny
(for example, equal protection doctrine). These tiers vary in how important
the asserted regulatory interest must be and how tightly connected that
interest must be to the regulation under attack. Presumptively invalid
regulatory classifications, such as race, receive nondeferential strict
scrutiny;159 a few others, including sex, receive intermediate scrutiny;160
mere rational basis review with extreme deference to policymakers is
applied elsewhere.161 Much free speech precedent has a similar character.162
But in other fields, this analytical structure is not apparent. In Eighth
Amendment cases, the Court looks to policy trends across the country and
then exercises its own judgment on whether the punishment in question is
cruel under contemporary standards of decency.163
Whatever shape Second Amendment doctrine takes in this expanse of
options, the country’s experience with judicial review does suggest
boundaries on its influence. First, judicial review cannot be fully detached
from politics. If nothing else, the appointments process connects judicial
personnel to organized interests and elected officials. The course of Second
Amendment litigation depends, in part, on who will judge these cases in the
future.
156.
See Davis v. FEC, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008) (invalidating a campaign finance regulation
by relying on free speech case law and not originalist history). Davis was issued on the same day
as Heller and was decided by the same 5–4 coalitions. The leading expositor of common law
constitutionalism is David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877 (1996).
157.
See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300, 303 (1999).
158.
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). Compare the Court’s general balancing test
for due process violations, which is a form of cost-benefit analysis, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976), and its “undue burden” test in abortion cases, see Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869–79 (1992) (joint opinion), with its rulings in some federalism cases,
which may promote more specific rules such as a prohibition on “commandeering” state officers,
see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
159.
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–27 (2003).
160.
See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723–24 (1982).
161.
See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
162.
See infra Part III.D.
163.
Justice Kennedy did so for the Court last Term. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct.
2641 (2008) (invalidating the death penalty for child rape).

56 UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009)

27

Second and related, the federal judiciary does not have an impressive
track record in making major policy change.164 Judges might resist the
intense policy preferences of others for a time, but courts are not insulated in
the long run. Thus the Supreme Court could not effectively desegregate
public schools alone, and it did not resist New Deal innovations forever. It
bears repeating that the gun rights movement began outside the courtroom,
and that handgun bans were already quite unpopular at the national level.
As should be apparent from our discussion in Part I, Heller stepped into an
existing regulatory and political structure built up over many years. It did
not discard that structure entirely. The Revolution might well be televised,
but it almost certainly will not be litigated.
We might then predict that Second Amendment litigation will probably
dampen regulatory diversity to some degree, without eliminating existing
gun control within the political mainstream.165 Surely the short-term impact
of Heller is a reduction in policy variation by eroding the most assertive end
of the regulatory spectrum. If the case is extended to state and local law,
this effect could be more serious. Local outliers will not be able to sustain
every local preference for strict gun control based on local conditions.

III.

ON THREATS AND SIDESHOWS TO SOCIAL WELFARE

Heller establishes a limited core right to handgun possession in the
home without necessarily meaning more. Courts could push further, and
they have models for relatively assertive judicial review in other fields. But
we doubt that constitutional litigation will radically change the character of
firearms regulation in the United States. There are few if any examples of
judicial power effectively implementing major social change. Courts tend to
work at the margins of public policy, and Heller does not commit the
Supreme Court to a more assertive mission. That said, courts could use the
Second Amendment to shape the future of gun control policy in significant
ways.
Our aim here is to speculate about the path of Second Amendment
litigation to come. We attempt to identify issues that plausibly could be
litigated and that could make a serious difference to social welfare based on
current knowledge. It turns out that some hot topics destined for judicial
resolution are of little or uncertain significance to sound and effective
164.
See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123, 251 (1994) (noting that courts can address only a
small fraction of significant policy disputes); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
165.
A similar view is defended in Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller
as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246 (2008).
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regulation of firearms, while possibly unappreciated constitutional
arguments pose real concerns for social welfare over the longer term.
We begin with a short discussion of incorporation and an inquiry into
whether the elimination of municipal handgun bans is truly a matter of
major concern. We ask the same question regarding the looming litigation
contest over a right to carry handguns in public. Then we turn to potential
challenges to firearms laws that give us greater pause: attacks on a variety of
laws and practices that treat guns as a special category, including excise
taxes on firearms, gun design regulation, and even gun-oriented policing.
Finally, we address the somewhat cloudy relationship between gun rights
litigation and regulatory innovation.
A.

Incorporation

Incorporation of Second Amendment norms against state and
municipal action has become a highly salient legal issue after Heller. The
Court’s majority mentioned the question,166 and the city of Chicago is
currently resisting incorporation in a lawsuit that challenges its handgun
ban.167 It is a virtual certainty that the Supreme Court will confront the
incorporation issue in the near future.
The significance of incorporation, however, is open to a measure of
debate. Clearly a judicial refusal to enforce Second Amendment norms
against state or local regulation would seriously undercut any practical
importance of Heller and its progeny. The federal government has not been
the principal source of gun control. The political environment has been such
that aggressive gun control efforts tend to occur in a select set of states and
cities; the absence of incorporation would leave those jurisdictions
untouched by Second Amendment litigation.168
The question is whether a judicial decision in favor of incorporation
would have much greater consequences. But we cannot answer without
knowing how Second Amendment doctrine itself will develop. If Heller is
interpreted narrowly—only flat handgun prohibitions are declared invalid—
166.
See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2813 n. 23.
167.
See supra note 133.
168.
One caveat is the possibility that state courts’ understanding of state constitutional gun
rights could be influenced by the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Second Amendment,
regardless of incorporation, and that the latter understanding could turn out to be expansive.
Assessing the likelihood of this possibility is difficult. It is plainly not a foregone conclusion, even
if the Supreme Court does take an expansive view of the amendment. Formal legal logic does not
require this result, but cf. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (adopted 1982) (linking state search and seizure
guarantees to U.S. Supreme Court doctrine), and state courts applying state constitutional law
sometimes explicitly reject Supreme Court elaboration of federal constitutional law as a model,
see, e.g., State v. Parker, 987 P.2d 73, 77–78 & nn. 1–2 (Wash. 1999) (involving searches).
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then the impact on gun policy will not be dramatic regardless of whether
states and municipalities are subject to suit.169 Of course judicial doctrine on
gun rights easily could become more assertive than that, and the mere threat
of litigation can influence policymaking. But the potential impact of
incorporation heavily depends on the as-yet unsettled content of Second
Amendment doctrine.
In any event, a fair guess is that the Heller majority is poised to
incorporate. Those five justices reserved the issue, but they gratuitously
observed that nineteenth-century precedents insulating state action had not
employed the Court’s more recent approach to incorporation.170 In addition,
the majority’s rendering of the Second Amendment right was emphatically
personal. This makes it difficult to resist application against the states with
an argument that the amendment was written to protect the militias of those
same states. Moreover, the majority’s discussion of Reconstruction Era
sources indicates a belief that those involved in creating the Fourteenth
Amendment were concerned about the gun rights of freed slaves.171 This
version of history would allow the Court to link gun rights to an antisubordination effort very different from another strut in the individual rights
heritage: Dred Scott v. Sandford.172 In addition, if the question is whether
the right is sufficiently “fundamental” to warrant enforcement against all
levels of government,173 the Heller opinion intimates an affirmative
answer.174
Finally, the Court could incorporate without totally repudiating Presser
v. Illinois,175 a key precedent in this area. That case rejected a gun rights
claim under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, but it involved state
restrictions on unauthorized military organizations parading as such.176 This
claim is far different from the demilitarized vision of gun rights endorsed in
169.
See also infra Part III.B (discussing the limited importance of handgun bans).
170.
See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2813 n. 23.
171.
See id. at 2809–11.
172.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857) (opinion of Taney, C.J.) (dictum) (referring to the
right to keep and bear arms in a list of unconstitutional federal “powers . . . in relation to rights of
person”), quoted in Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub
nom., Heller v. District of Columbia, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
173.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968) (regarding jury trial rights in
criminal cases). Note that the plaintiffs in the Chicago litigation are asking the courts to reconsider
the narrow understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause in
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), in addition to arguing for incorporation
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Plaintiffs’ Motion to Narrow
Legal Issues 4–5, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-CV-3645 (Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.chicagoguncase.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/motionnarrowlegalissues.pdf.
174.
Cf. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2798 (“By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had
become fundamental for English subjects.”).
175.
116 U.S. 252 (1886).
176.
See id. at 264–66.
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Heller. It seems that Presser comes out the same way under Heller
regardless of the Court’s position on incorporation—which is another
reminder that the stakes of incorporation depend on the substance of the
right to be enforced.
We cannot know with certainty how today’s justices will respond to
arguments on incorporation, a topic that the Court has not often confronted
in recent decades and that implicates critical judicial choices concerning
federalism and constitutional jurisprudence more generally. But we can still
conjecture as to the plausible substance and impact of Second Amendment
rights after Heller, assuming that incorporation will happen.
B.

Handgun Bans

Heller establishes that the current Supreme Court will not tolerate
comprehensive handgun bans when such laws are challenged by citizens
that the Court believes are otherwise entitled to possess handguns for the
purpose of self-defense in the home. The question for us is whether this
judicial commitment matters much, even if it applies against state and local
action and not only the federal government and its enclaves. There are at
least two perspectives from which to respond. The first is political, in that it
considers the viability of proposed handgun bans among policymakers. The
second perspective involves policy consequences, in that it assumes the
enactment of handgun bans and considers their potential influence on social
welfare. As far as we can discern from the available evidence, neither
perspective does much to establish the impact of handgun bans on social
welfare in the United States.
1.

A Political Perspective

Of all the forms that gun control takes in America, comprehensive
handgun bans are among the least popular. This policy has never been an
element of federal law or, it seems, a realistic proposal at the national level.
A handful of municipalities have enacted handgun prohibitions, among them
are the major metropolises of Chicago and the District of Columbia. But
these locations and their political settings are fairly unique. It is possible
that the center of political gravity in other localities is such that handgun
bans would be enacted but for state-level politics that prevents them. Most
states now have preemption legislation or precedent that allocates
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lawmaking authority over firearms to state legislatures rather than city
councils.177
Of course, if handguns bans were generally popular, then elevating the
level for gun control policymaking from cities to states would not
necessarily lead to less territory being covered by such bans. But they are
not popular, at least according to recent public opinion polling. In a 2007
Gallup Poll, sixty-eight percent of respondents opposed a handgun ban.178
Opposition reached across several demographic categories. Respondents
with postgraduate education expressed opposition at a sixty percent level,
and fifty-seven percent of women over age fifty were also opposed.179 It is
worth emphasizing that litigation threats are an unlikely explanation for the
rarity of handgun bans. Until 2008, Second Amendment arguments were
ineffectual in courts, and state constitutional adjudication was not radically
more inhibiting.180 Handgun bans have been unpopular with policymakers
for other reasons. From what we can gather, the political resistance to
handgun bans is not the result of a well-organized gun rights minority
blocking the preferences of a dispersed majority. This public choice story
might fit the resistance to other gun-control proposals—some of which show
national majority support in polling181—but it is probably a weak
explanation for the rarity of handgun prohibitions.182
There is a notable qualification here, however. Political environments
are not stable over the long term and so there is no guarantee that popular
preferences regarding handgun regulation are fixed. Demand for more
aggressive legislation in urban areas could develop over time, at least in the
absence of serious litigation threats.183 Constitutional litigation has the
potential to inhibit those political changes, certainly at the margins and
177.
See, e.g., Sippel v. Nelder, 101 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1972) (invalidating a San
Francisco handgun permitting system in favor of state law); Beckman, supra note 85, at 478.
178.
See GALLUP POLL SOCIAL SERIES: CRIME (Oct. 4–7, 2007) (question 21)
179.
See id at 252. See also Sunstein, supra note 165, at 252 (asserting that “national
opposition to a ban on handguns has been larger and more consistent in recent years”).
180.
See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding a
local operative handgun ban against state constitutional, Second Amendment, and Ninth
Amendment claims), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove,
470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984) (rejecting a claim under a qualified state constitutional right to keep and
bear arms).
181.
See SMITH, supra note 15, at 1 (showing support for a variety of gun regulations).
182.
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that there is an unorganized majority in
some states that would prefer greater decentralization in gun control policymaking but that is
blocked by a better organized gun rights movement.
183.
The Village of Morton Grove, which apparently enacted the first comprehensive
municipal handgun prohibition, repealed its law after opponents filed suit in the wake of Heller.
See Robert Channick, Morton Grove Repeals 27-Year-Old Gun Ban, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2008
(“Fighting in court to try to keep the law would cost money the village does not have, officials
said.”).
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possibly beyond. For some observers, this lock-in effect is desirable. But
regardless of one’s ideological predispositions on firearms regulation, Heller
and its incorporation against municipal action might be important insofar as
courts could drive a wedge between emerging political preferences and valid
law. We discuss the chilling effects on policy innovation below.
2.

A Policy Consequence Perspective

Even if judicial doctrine ultimately stands against handgun bans
enacted by any level of government, one can ask whether these formal laws
have much impact on social welfare. An effective judicial campaign to
eliminate certain types of legislation is not necessarily a matter of serious
concern if the targeted legislation is ineffectual. If, however, such
legislation tends to reduce the prevalence of handgun ownership by raising
the costs of acquisition, even if acquisition remains possible, then the
question becomes how handgun ownership is related to crime and public
health. There has been considerable research on this relationship.
a.

Gun Prevalence, Crime, and Public Health

Firearms are the most lethal of the widely available weapons deployed
in assaults, robberies, and self-defense. They are the great equalizer. With a
gun, most anyone can threaten or inflict grave injury on another, even
someone with greater skill, strength and determination. With a gun, unlike a
knife, one individual can kill another quickly, at a distance, on impulse.
The logical and documented result is that, when a gun is present in an
assault or robbery, the victim is more likely to die. It is not only the
assailant’s intent that determines the outcome, but also the means of attack.
This conclusion regarding instrumentality has been demonstrated in a
variety of ways and is no longer controversial among social scientists.184
Thus widespread gun use in violent crime intensifies violence, increasing the
case-fatality rate. The United States is exceptional with respect to violent
crime not because we have so much more of it, but because widespread gun
availability and use means that our violence is so much more deadly than
other Western nations.185
184.
See Franklin E. Zimring, The Medium Is the Message: Firearm Calibre as a
Determinant of Death From Assault, 1 J.L. STUDIES 97 (1972); Franklin E. Zimring, Is Gun
Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (1968); Cook, supra note 11, at
18–19; William Wells & Julie Horney, Weapon Effects and Individual Intent to Do Harm:
Influences on the Escalation of Violence, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 265 (2002).
185.
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM:
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 52 (1997) (comparing the United States with other developed
nations in terms of life-threatening and other violence).
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The likelihood that a gun will be used in crime is closely linked to the
general availability of guns, and especially handguns. In jurisdictions where
handgun ownership is common, the various types of transactions by which
youths and criminals become armed are facilitated. The list of transactions
includes thefts from homes and vehicles, loans to family members and
friends, and off-the-books sales.
In a high-prevalence area, then,
transactions in the secondary market are subject to less friction and may
well be cheaper than in markets where gun ownership is rare.186 While there
is no evidence that gun prevalence affects the rate of violent crime, gun
prevalence does have a demonstrable effect on the likelihood that the
assailants in robbery and assault will be armed with guns, resulting in a
higher case-fatality rate than would otherwise occur.187
Research on the effects of gun prevalence has been facilitated by the
discovery of a useful proxy: the percentage of suicides committed with
guns.188 It allows us to analyze how gun use relates to the prevalence of gun
ownership across states or even counties. This proxy has been used to
document a strong positive relationship between county gun prevalence and
each of the following outcomes: the fraction of robberies involving guns, the
fraction of homicides with guns, the likelihood that young men carry a gun,
and, most important, the overall homicide rate.189 Considerable care was
taken in these studies to establish that the relationship was causal, although
in the absence of experimental evidence there necessarily remains some
doubt. The bulk of the evidence at this point suggests more prevalent
handgun ownership engenders more widespread use of guns in crime and
higher social costs of crime.
From a public health perspective, a concern for the effects of gun
prevalence on suicide is as important as the effect on homicide. In fact, gun
suicide is more common than gun homicide, although it seems fair to say
that the threat of suicide does not have the same broad effects on quality of
life as does the threat of violent crime. The assertion that gun availability
influences the suicide rate may be questioned on the grounds that, unlike in
the case of assault, someone who wishes to commit suicide has a choice of
alternative mechanisms that can be equally as effective as a gunshot.
186.
See Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, S.A. Venkatesh & Anthony A. Braga, Underground
Gun Markets, 117 ECONOMICS J. 588 (2007).
187.
See COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 30, at 35–36.
188.
See Azrael, Cook & Miller, supra note __, at __; Gary Kleck, Measures of Gun
Ownership Levels for Macrolevel Crime and Violence Research, 41 J. RES. IN CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 3 (2004).
189.
See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 10, at 387 (connecting the proxy for county-level gun
prevalence to overall homicide rates); COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 15, at __; Philip J. Cook &
Jens Ludwig, Does Gun Prevalence Affect Teen Gun Carrying After All?, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 27
(2004).
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Nonetheless, in the United States a majority of successful suicides are with
guns, although guns are involved in only a small fraction of attempted
suicides. Those determined to kill themselves can find a way but, for those
attempting suicide on impulse, the lethality of readily available and
psychologically acceptable weapons appears to matter. A recent review of
the evidence by Matthew Miller and David Hemenway collects numerous
case control studies comparing gun-owning households to observably
similar households without guns, as well as ecological research pointing to
the same conclusion.190 While this empirical research helps make the case,
it is the logic and descriptive information on suicide that is most compelling
to us.
If an ultimate consequence of Heller is increased handgun ownership in
some jurisdictions, these likely effects on violent crime and suicide may be
viewed as tangential to the intended effect of the decision—to safeguard the
right of trustworthy householders to defend their home against intruders. In
that light, perhaps the most relevant consequences of increased gun
prevalence are the effect on residential burglary rates and home-invasion
rates. Unfortunately we have no reliable data on the frequency with which
householders actually do use a gun to defend against home invasion, or with
what success. Certainly it happens occasionally, but how frequently
remains a mystery. Survey data do not provide a reliable basis for finding
the answer because self-reports in this instance are unreliable. Moreover,
the estimated frequencies differ by an order of magnitude, perhaps
depending on how the questions are asked.191
However, we can estimate the influence of gun prevalence on burglary
rates and patterns. One study, which used a variety of data sets and
methods, concluded that the prevalence of gun ownership in a county is
positively related to the burglary rate.192 This association does not appear
spurious, but rather most likely results from an inducement effect. Other
things equal, residential burglary tends to be more profitable in communities
where guns are likely to be part of the available loot. The rate of “hot”
burglaries (break-ins of occupied homes) is also positively related to gun
prevalence, although the effect is small.

190.
See Matthew Miller et al., Household Firearm Ownership and Rates of Suicide Across
the 50 United States, 62 J. TRAUMA 1029 (2007); Matthew Miller & David Hemenway, Guns and
Suicide in the United States, 359 N. ENG. J. MED. 989 (2008); M. Duggan, Guns and Suicide, in
EVALUATING GUN POLICY, supra note __, at 41.
191.
See Hemenway, supra note 42, at 69 (pointing to a large difference between assertions
of some gun proponents and results from the National Crime Victimization Survey, which posed
open questions to people who had actually reported an incident).
192.
See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns and Burglary, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY,
supra note __, at 74.
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Let us review the chain of logic. To the extent that Heller and
subsequent Court decisions make handguns cheaper and more readily
available in some jurisdictions, those jurisdictions will likely experience an
increase in demand for handguns and ultimately an increase in the
prevalence of ownership. An increase in ownership prevalence will in turn
make guns more readily available to criminals, thereby increasing gun use in
violent crime and suicide, resulting in an increased death rate from
intentional violence. Burglary rates are also likely to increase as burglary
becomes more lucrative. But as it turns out, the first link of that chain—the
connection between invalidating handgun bans and increased prevalence of
handgun ownership—is the weakest empirically. It requires further
discussion.
b.

Will Handgun Prevalence Increase in the District?

The District of Columbia’s ban on handgun acquisitions was enacted in
1976. But, by the late 1980s, the notion that the ban had achieved anything
useful seemed unlikely, given common references to the city as the
“Homicide Capital of the World.”193 Of course we do not know how high
the homicide rate spike would have been in the absence of the ban. Yet
there is good evidence that the ban was ineffective in preventing members
of the public from arming themselves during the turbulence of the 1980s.
In fact, homicides and suicides declined by approximately twenty-five
percent around the time of the ban, led by reductions in homicides and
suicides with guns194—before the tsunami of violence stemming from the
introduction of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s. Still controversial is the
issue of how much of this decline can be attributed to the handgun ban
rather than other factors.
In an influential article published in the New England Journal of
Medicine, criminologist Colin Loftin and his colleagues showed that
homicides and suicides declined in Washington, D.C., and by a greater
margin than in the city’s Maryland and Virginia suburbs.195 A challenge to
the use of affluent suburbs as a control group for the city196 prompted
193.
See Matthew Cella, Murder Rate Raises Concern, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at B1.
But cf. Vance Garnett, Op-Ed, Homicide: Will the Shake-Up Help?, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1997,
at C8 (asserting that Newsweek coined the term with respect to D.C. in 1941).
194.
See C. Loftin, D. McDowall, B. Wiersema & T. Cottey, Effects of Restrictive Licensing
of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 N. ENG. J. MED. 1615
(1991).
195.
See id. at 1616–17.
196.
See C.L. Britt, G. Kleck & G. Bordua, A Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law: Some
Cautionary Notes on the Use of Interrupted Time Series Designs for Policy Impact Assessment, 30
L. & SOC’Y REV. 361 (1996).
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additional research using Baltimore data. Like the District, Baltimore also
experienced a decline in firearm homicides around 1976. But unlike the
District, Baltimore experienced a reduction in both non-gun and gun
homicides, suggesting some general change in Baltimore during this time
period that was not specific to guns. Further, Baltimore did not experience a
decline in gun suicides.197
It is interesting, then, to analyze gun-ownership rates in the District of
Columbia and Baltimore during this period. Figure 1 tracks the proxy for
gun ownership from the period before the ban until the end of the 1990s.
The rate jumps up in the late 1980s, just as the crack epidemic was pushing
up criminal violence—but Baltimore had quite a different trajectory during
that time. Gun ownership has declined in the District since the early 1990s,
and in recent years has dropped lower than when the ban was initiated in
1976 (and far lower than the national average). Perhaps the lesson from the
early years is that a ban in a small jurisdiction with porous borders is
difficult to enforce, especially in the face of broad concern caused by a
major crime epidemic. Oddly, this may be good news for the District: It
suggests that the removal of the handgun ban may have little effect, standing
alone, on the prevalence of handgun ownership.
The data hint at a similar pattern in Chicago, home to the other notable
handgun ban susceptible to legal challenge following Heller. In 1982,
Chicago essentially banned private ownership of handguns, with a
grandfather exception enabling those already in possession of handguns to
register them with the city. Figure 2 shows that FSS in all of Cook County
declined somewhat during a brief period after the city’s ban was enacted,
but then reverted to pre-ban levels.198 Whether the FSS in Chicago proper
followed the same pattern is unknown; the city has only about half of the
County’s suicides.199
In sum, the effect of these local handgun bans on the prevalence of gun
ownership is uncertain, although there is some indication that it has not been
large. This does not mean that these and other interventions have no effect
on the prices and availability of guns. Fortunately, the underground gun
market in Chicago does not work well, and young people and criminals tend
to have a difficult time obtaining a gun if they are not gang members.200
The handgun ban and the ban on licensed dealers in that city may contribute
197.
See D. McDowall, C. Loftin & B. Wiersema, Using Quasi-Experiments to Evaluate
Firearms Laws: Comment on Britt et al's Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV.
381 (1996).
198.
See also Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Effects of the Brady Act on Gun Violence,
in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 283 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003).
199.
See ILLINOIS DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH, VITAL STATISTICS: COUNTY VITAL
STATISTICS 95, 123 (2002), available at http://www.idph.state.il.us/health/statshome.htm.
200.
See Cook et al., supra note 186.
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to these frictions. But available data leads us to question whether judicial
invalidation of (weakly enforced) handgun bans would seriously threaten
social welfare. The general political hostility to such prohibitions adds to
our skepticism. It is therefore plausible that the most obvious implication of
Heller for formal law has little significance for sound and politically feasible
gun control.

FIGURE 1: PERCENT SUICIDES WITH GUNS IN WASHINGTON, DC, AND
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND201
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FIGURE 2: PERCENT SUICIDES WITH GUNS IN COOK COUNTY AND
202
THE REST OF ILLINOIS

201.
Figure 1 presents five-year averages for the percent of suicides committed with guns, a
proxy for household gun ownership rates. See supra notes 188–189.
202.
Figure 2 presents five-year averages for the percent of suicides committed with guns, a
proxy for household gun ownership rates. See supra notes 188–189.
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C.

Public Places and Concealed Carry

In addition to the issues of incorporation and municipal handgun bans,
Second Amendment litigation will likely address a right to carry weapons in
public places. Whether otherwise qualified gun owners should be entitled to
carry firearms beyond their homes and into generally accessible locations,
including a right to carry concealed firearms, has been on the policy agenda
for more than a century. The Supreme Court itself, in dicta from 1897,
indicated that the Second Amendment does not protect concealed carry.203
But this suggestion might be reconsidered or left narrow by reliance on
Heller’s self-defense theme. It could be argued that protecting oneself from
violence in high-crime areas is no more important within the home than out
in the open. True, this argument runs into some of Heller’s hedging on
handgun rights. During its discussion of limits on Second Amendment
rights, the majority opinion observed that nineteenth-century state court
cases had usually rejected constitutional claims to a right of concealed
carry.204 Elsewhere, however, the majority noted some nineteenth-century
judicial support for a right to unconcealed pistols.205 Part of that
203.
See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897) (“Thus, the freedom of speech
and of the press (article 1) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent
articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private reputation; the right of the
people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of
concealed weapons . . . .”).
204.
See Heller v. District of Columbia, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008).
205.
See id. at 2809, 2818.
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jurisprudence is, to put it politely, unrelated to modern forms of public
policy analysis, but it does suggest that gun rights can extend into public
places without including concealed carry. Thus an 1850 decision from
Louisiana lauded “a manly and noble defence” with unconcealed weapons
while disparaging “secret advantages and unmanly assassinations” with
concealed weapons.206
However the courtroom arguments about gun rights in public (or
manliness) might play out in the twenty-first century, our question is
whether one result would have significantly different consequences from
another. It is certainly true that permit systems of some kind are a
politically viable form of gun control in many jurisdictions. Indeed, almost
all states require that legal gun owners obtain a permit to carry a concealed
firearm in public, although over time a growing number of states have
relaxed their requirements for issuing such permits.207 What would it mean
to social welfare if otherwise qualified citizens possessed a federal
constitutional right to carry guns in public, whether openly in a holster or
concealed on their person? What if this right were subject to approval
through a permit system? There is no uncontroversial answer to these
questions, especially in light of the different forms that a right to public
carry might take. But we can present salient arguments and existing
empirical data.208
Those who wish to encourage gun carrying in public places by private
parties argue that the increased likelihood of encountering an armed victim
will deter criminals. This possibility receives some support from prisoner
surveys: eighty percent of prisoners in one survey agreed with the statement
that “a smart criminal always tries to find out if his potential victim is
armed.”209 But the same data also raise the possibility that an increase in
gun carrying could prompt an arms race. Two-thirds of prisoners
206.
207.

State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850).
See John A. Dvorak, Concealed Weapons Laws Taking Hold, Broadening Across U.S.,
KNIGHT-RIDDER/TRIB.
NEWS
SERV.,
Mar.
1,
2002,
available
at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-83407220.html.
208.
It is possible that law enforcement officers’ stop-and-frisk authority would be curtailed
if the courts established a right to carry concealed weapons in public. Police officers might have
more difficulty establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support a stop, see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968), although stops might often be justified on grounds not necessarily
related to illegal gun possessioin, such as suspicion of drug crimes. But, in any event, the officer
safety justification for the stop-and-frisk doctrine seems adequate to preserve pat downs and
weapons seizures during certain police-citizen encounters regardless of whether police suspect
unlawful or lawful gun possession. See id. at 23–24, 29–30. A hitch for police officers might be
their authority to keep seized weapons at the end of a street encounter if the citizen is not arrested,
lawfully possesses the firearm, and asks for the weapon back on the spot. These interchanges
might be risky yet implicate a broad view of Second Amendment rights.
209.
See WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 26, at 145.
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incarcerated for gun offenses reported that the chance of running into an
armed victim was very or somewhat important in their own choice to use a
gun.210 Currently, criminals use guns in only about twenty-five percent of
noncommercial robberies and five percent of assaults.211 If increased gun
carrying among potential victims causes criminals to carry guns more often
themselves, or become quicker to use guns to avert armed self-defense, the
end result could be that street crime becomes more lethal.212
In a provocative series of research papers and books, economist John
Lott has argued that the deterrent effects of moving from restrictive to
permissive gun-carrying laws dominate.213 On the other side economist
John Donohue argues that, while Lott’s analysis improves on previous
research on this topic, Lott’s findings cannot support the conclusion that
ending restrictive concealed-carry laws reduces crime.214 Donohue’s reanalysis of the Lott data indicates that states that eventually ended restrictive
concealed-carry laws had systematically different crime trends from the
other states even before these law changes went into effect. The tendency to
adopt the law under study following an unusual spike in crime—which
would ordinarily be followed by a reduction regardless of whether a new
law were passed—makes the analysis problematic. Indeed, Donohue finds
much evidence in support of the view that these laws increased crime rates
in the 1990s, when crime was generally declining. Hence the estimated
treatment effect may in fact be due to whatever unmeasured factors caused
crime trends to diverge before the laws were enacted.
Regardless of who gets the better of this particular debate, we want to
stress the issue of magnitudes. Whether the net effect of relaxing concealedcarry laws is to increase or reduce the burden of crime, there is good reason
to believe that the net is not large. One study found that in twelve of the
sixteen permissive concealed-carry states studied, fewer than two percent of
210.
See id. at 147.
211.
See MICHAEL R. RAND, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2007, at 6 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Dec. 2008) (reporting, as well, that offenders used firearms in 7.1% of all violent crimes
in 2007).
212.
The analysis is complicated by the choice between rights to carry concealed as opposed
to unconcealed weapons outside the home. If people have a right to carry handguns in public but
the government could validly and effectively mandate unconcealed carry, then potential aggressors
would receive reliable information regarding which would-be victims are most vulnerable.
Perhaps unconcealed carry cannot be effectively required. But such a regime of rights and
regulations (that is, mandatory unconcealed carry) could be meaningfully different from a legal
regime in which people have a right to choose whether or not to conceal their weapons (that is,
optional concealed carry)—or in which government mandates concealment for any person
otherwise entitled to possess a weapon in public (that is, mandatory concealed carry).
213.
See LOTT, supra note 74, at 115; John R. Lott & D.B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence and
Right-To-Carry Concealed Handguns, 16 J.L. STUDIES 1 (1997).
214.
See John J. Donohue, The Impact of Concealed-Carry Laws, in EVALUATING GUN
POLICY, supra note __, at 287.
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adults had obtained permits to carry concealed handguns.215 And the actual
change in gun-carrying prevalence will be smaller than the number of
permits issued would suggest, because many of those who obtain permits
were already carrying guns in public.216 Moreover, the change in gun
carrying appears to be concentrated in rural and suburban areas where crime
rates are already relatively low, among people who are at relatively low risk
of victimization—white, middle-aged, middle-class males.217 The available
data about permit holders also imply that they are at fairly low risk of
misusing guns, consistent with the relatively low arrest rates observed to
date for permit holders.218
Based on available empirical data, therefore, we expect relatively little
public safety impact if courts invalidate laws that prohibit gun carrying
outside the home, assuming that some sort of permit system for public carry
is allowed to stand. The result would most likely be a modest change in gun
carrying rates among a subset of the population that is itself at relatively low
risk of either gun offending or victimization. Of course, we cannot
confidently predict that a judicially enforceable right to public carry would
not change the composition of those who carry guns in public; and the
effects on public safety could be different depending on whether any such
right includes the choice to conceal as opposed to openly carry a firearm
outside the home. As well, our analysis would be different if a right to
public carry were coupled with an enlargement of the class of people
entitled to acquire firearms beyond what today’s permitting systems already
allow, or if government were not allowed to operate a permit system at all.
Even if the test for issuance is fairly permissive, imposing a permit
requirement might well affect the composition of gun carriers in positive
ways. On the available data, however, the issue of public carry standing
alone seems more likely to be litigated than to seriously affect social
welfare.
D.

Gun-Targeted Taxes, Safety Programs, and Policing

Given the discussion above and the Heller majority’s apparent
commitment to immunizing much of the existing gun control regime, the

215.
See J.M. Hill, The Impact of Liberalized Concealed Weapon Statutes on Rates of
Violent Crime __ (1997) (unpublished senior thesis, Duke University, Public Policy).
216.
See G. Robuck-Mangum, Concealed Weapon Permit Holders in North Carolina: A
Descriptive Study of Handgun-Carrying Behavior __ (1997) (unpublished master’s thesis,
University of North Carolina, School of Public Health).
217.
See Hill, supra note 215, at __.
218.
See LOTT, supra note 74, at 37–39, 185 n.1, 197 n. 22.
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stakes of Second Amendment litigation seem low. But there might be
greater threats to sound public policy in the future.
Our first concern is that courts might someday hold that special
regulatory treatment of firearms is prima facie evidence of a constitutional
violation. That is, judges might consider it presumptively problematic that
government action singles out firearms or handguns, and then require a
justification so demanding that reasonably reliable evidence and logic
become insufficient for gun control to survive. Demanding anything like
mathematical certainty that a regulation will enhance public safety at
acceptable cost would jeopardize large swaths of existing and potential gun
control efforts. Everything from gun taxes, to gun design requirements, to
gun safety programs involving permits and licenses, to gun registration and
information collection efforts, to gun-oriented policing in high-violence
neighborhoods could be disrupted—unless regulators show analogous
treatment of other products or otherwise survive skeptical judicial scrutiny
of the program’s value.
Nothing in Heller commits the Court to this path, but it would not be
entirely foreign to constitutional adjudication. Free speech and free exercise
of religion doctrine includes this sort of anti-targeting structure.219 In these
fields the modern Court has often concentrated on government action that
not only burdens behavior the justices believe constitutionally valued, but
that singles out such behavior for special disfavor. To be clear, this antitargeting approach does not fit all of the doctrine.220 Nor is it easy to
identify which forms of regulatory targeting ought to be problematic. This
requires a theory. For instance, the Court has been relatively unconcerned
when government regulates the time, place, or manner of speech without
explicitly targeting speech content,221 even though such choices can be
crucial to speakers and audiences. Regardless, one must have a justifiable
definition of “the freedom of speech” before one can tell whether regulation
targets the phenomenon. It is not at all obvious how “the right to keep and
bear arms” should be fully specified, and then how the doctrinal categories
from free speech or free exercise litigation might be imported into the gun
rights field. It is nevertheless worth raising the First Amendment analogy.
The Heller majority did so in several places.222

219.
See generally Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 NW.
U. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (2004).
220.
See id. at 1318, 1355–71 (identifying situations where claimant conduct matters to
formal First Amendment doctrine and its functions).
221.
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
222.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2790–91, 2797, 2799, 2805, 2812,
2813 n. 23, 2816, 2817 n. 27, 2821 (2008) (connecting First and Second Amendment text, history,
and judicial treatment).
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Consider in this regard a tributary of speech doctrine that leans hard
against special taxation of the traditional press. In 1983, the Court declared
invalid a state tax on paper and ink used for producing publications, with
exemptions for the first $100,000 worth—even though it appeared that the
complaining newspapers would have paid more under the state’s general
sales tax.223 On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly rejected press
claims for exemption from regulation that reaches other industries, despite
the real economic burdens that may be imposed on the media: The Court
grants media operations no constitutional immunity from labor or antitrust
laws that are applicable to other businesses.224 This kind of logic might be
exported to Second Amendment litigation. Indeed, regulatory cost concerns
have already arisen after Heller. Plaintiffs challenging gun control in
Chicago are not only objecting to the city’s handgun ban, they also seek
invalidation of a recurring firearms registration and fee requirement.225
Now consider the federal excise tax. Since 1919, the federal
government has collected an excise tax on firearms.226 This one-time tax on
sales now stands at ten percent of the manufacturer’s price for handguns and
eleven percent for long guns.227 At least part of this tax is surely passed
along to consumers. Even if a tax burden by itself will not trigger
heightened judicial skepticism, a post-Heller judiciary might nevertheless
ask whether a firearms tax law is special compared to other taxation
schemes and whether the government can explain the differences
persuasively. If firearms are taxed like sporting goods, perhaps judges
become passive; but if they are taxed in a unique way, perhaps judges
become inquisitive. It is of course possible for government lawyers to
defend special treatment for firearms by linking their prevalence or misuse
to social harm and to the level of taxation or other regulation in question.
But case outcomes would depend upon what kind of logic is persuasive to
judges and how much evidence they demand to support the regulation. And
of course taxation can be the product of political opportunity and demand
elasticities rather than distinctions that a judge will deem principled.
223.
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
577–79, 588–91 (1983) (expressing concern that judges will not be able to calculate tax burdens);
id. at 597–98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (comparing liability under the sales tax). The sales tax
was not necessarily the correct baseline from which to compare; exemptions to the paper-and-ink
tax meant that only a few large newspapers paid the tax.
224.
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937).
225.
See supra note 133.
226.
See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, tit. IX, sec. 900(10), 40 Stat. 1058
(Feb. 24, 1919).
227.
See Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, Tax and Fee Rate, available at
http://www.ttb.gov/tax_audit/atftaxes.shtml. Ordinary wine is taxed at only 21¢/bottle.
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If courts are sufficiently demanding and if they are sufficiently
sensitive to cost increases from firearms regulation, there could be major
losses in social welfare. Minimizing the cost of acquiring firearms
obviously benefits those who sell and those who enjoy possessing them, but
these gains arrive with threats. One worrisome possibility is that concerned
judges would invalidate gun control efforts or targeted taxation with a
reasonable chance of seriously improving public health and safety but that is
nevertheless experimental. Furthermore, gun-targeted laws can be designed
to offset negative externalities that empirical study is associating with
firearms. By one estimate, keeping a handgun in the home is associated
with at least $600 per year in externalities.228 On the usual logic of
corrective taxation, it would pay to raise the current firearms tax rate so that
handgun owners internalize the full social costs of their choices.229
Attempts to tax or otherwise regulate firearms based on estimates of their
social costs are threatened by constitutional doctrine that flatly disfavors
such special treatment absent conclusive proof of those social costs. Even
information collection systems could be at risk.230
228.
See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 10, at 390.
229.
Apart from taxation, liability insurance is an alternative mechanism for the
internalization of externalities associated with gun ownership. A standard homeowners’ insurance
policy ordinarily covers liability for accidents involving guns, but often with an exemption for
intentional harms, or even for harms resulting from criminal acts. See Tom Baker & Thomas O.
Farrish, Liability Insurance and the Regulation of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 292 (T.
Lytton ed., 2005); Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT LINES:
TORT LAW AND CULTURAL PRACTICE (D.M. Engle & M. McCann eds., forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1314309. It is
not clear how far liability or liability coverage extends for cases in which the gun is transferred by
the owner to someone else, or stolen, and then misused. To the best of our knowledge, no states or
localities require gun owners to obtain such insurance. The threat of litigation following Heller
could stifle local experiments with such policies.
230.
The public safety consequence of repealing licensing and registration systems is a bit
unclear based on available evidence. These systems do provide information regarding who owns
what guns, information that could prove useful to law-enforcement investigations. The most vivid
example is in the future. The California law requiring pistols sold after 2010 to have micro-stamp
capability will be more useful if the state is allowed to continue handgun registration; the
regulatory combination should help investigators connect shell casings found at the scene of a
crime and the current or recent owner of the gun. Unfortunately, evaluation of existing state-level
licensing and registration systems is forced to rely on weak research designs, yielding evidence for
regulatory impact on immediate output measures but not on outcomes of more direct policy
interest. For example, D.W. Webster, J.S. Vernick & L.M. Hepburn, Relationship Between
Licensing, Registration and Other Gun Sales Laws and the Source State of Crime Guns, 7 INJURY
PREVENTION 184 (2001), finds some effect of licensing and registration requirements on the
fraction of confiscated crime guns that were first purchased out of state. How informative this is
about the ease with which criminals can obtain guns, or ultimately the overall rate of gun crime
within a community, is unclear. A study of the federal Brady Act suggests the ability of the
secondary gun market to shift and at least partially offset changes to the supply side of the market.
After Brady was enacted, Chicago experienced a large drop in the share of crime guns first sold out
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To economists, the effect of taxation and other requirements on the
price of guns is not just an incidental detail, but rather may have an
important effect on gun sales, use, and misuse. It seems apparent that the
most important health-related outcome likely to come from the cigarette
litigation has been the increase in the price of cigarettes resulting from the
financial settlement with the states.231 The tax on new guns, though much
more modest proportionally, should also have some effect on demand,
reducing the number of guns and the prevalence of gun ownership by some
amount. The economic logic here rests on the strong presumption that a tax
on new guns will be passed on to the secondary market by restricting the
quantity available from the primary market.232 The same price effect can be
achieved by imposing permit fees or by establishing minimum quality
standards—as with the ban on imports of low-quality handguns—or by
requiring special features on new guns, such as locking devices or
microstamp capability. But these initiatives tend to make guns special from
a regulatory perspective.
We have reason to believe, however, that courts will not aggressively
follow an anti-targeting theme in Second Amendment doctrine. First, for
reasons noted above, judges are unlikely to radically uproot gun control
regardless of the doctrinal forms they adopt. Second, an anti-targeting
theme is not necessarily sensible for the Second Amendment as a matter of
lawyers’ logic. It depends on what motivates courts to single out singling
out, so to speak.
Part of the motivation derives from a conclusion that an enormous
variety of government action can negatively influence the exercise of
constitutionally valued behavior, and that not every adverse effect can or
should be policed by courts.233 This limit on judicial ambition does seem
equally applicable to Second Amendment litigation. If mass media must
pay property taxes, and if the Constitution is no barrier to enforcing
religiously-neutral drug laws against religious ritual,234 then it is difficult to
see why handguns cannot validly be subject to a general sales tax or to premarket approval from a product safety commission, for example.
of state, yet the fraction of homocides committed with a gun did not seem to change at all. See
Cook & Braga, supra note 26, at 304–07; Cook & Ludwig, supra note 190, at 21–22.
231.
See Frank J. Chaloupka & Kenneth E. Warner, The Economics of Smoking, in 1B
HANDBOOK OF HEATH ECONOMICS 1539, 1546–56 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse
eds. 2000) (reviewing studies for the proposition that monetary price increases tend to reduce
cigarette demand, despite the product’s addictive qualities).
232.
See Philip J. Cook & J.A. Leitzel, Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy: An Economic Analysis
of the Attack on Gun Control, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1996).
233.
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech
and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993).
234.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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The complication arises from the necessity of identifying which forms
of regulatory targeting might be constitutionally troubling. It is not enough
for a court to recognize constitutional value in the private conduct at issue.
Such value is jeopardized whether or not regulators single it out for special
treatment. To enforce an anti-targeting theme while minimizing or ignoring
other government-instigated burdens, judges ought to have a convincing
reason for their skepticism of regulatory targeting itself.
In the free speech field, one might conclude that government regulation
isolating particular messages for uniquely burdensome treatment is
presumptively problematic. This could be based on a theory that, say,
government officials are especially likely to use such regulation to entrench
their own power and to freeze the political environment against logical
testing and innovation.235 And we might believe that, in general, forcing the
political system to treat communication more like other conduct provides a
handy safeguard. Speakers will thereby have natural allies in the democratic
process who are likewise threatened with regulatory burden.236
But we have doubts that courts could faithfully translate this logic into
the gun rights domain. We are aware of no convincing theory of just
political power that identifies the gun rights movement as in need of federal
judicial assistance. This movement is anything but a perennial loser in
ordinary politics, and a judicial attempt to multiply allies for the gun lobby
would be hard to justify on a reasonable vision of equitably distributed
political influence. One might believe that existing gun control is too
onerous without believing that the political process is rigged in its favor.
Nor is it clear what special skepticism the judiciary should have when
it comes to firearms regulation. If we focus on Heller’s reasoning, the
majority’s key concern was handgun possession for self-defense in the
home. It is doubtful that regulators surreptitiously harbor ill will toward
those hoping to protect themselves against criminal intruders, or that they
will often use firearms regulations as a method for squelching self-defense
efforts. Had Heller emphasized the problem of centralized tyranny, our
analysis would be different. But it did not. The majority’s vision for the
right was mainstreamed and demilitarized.237 Once the rationale for gun
rights moves away from tyranny of the central government and towards
more mainstream values such as self-defense from private criminal assault,
235.
See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 43–44, 80–
86 (1982) (suggesting regulation might be distrusted more than speech is especially valued).
236.
See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
205 (3d ed. 2007). There are other theories that might support anti-targeting themes and yet still
weaken the case for substantial burdens tests; perhaps a targeted burden amounts to a special form
of injury. But this is a start.
237.
See supra Part II.A.
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judges would seem to have less reason to worry that specialized gun
regulation is one step toward a constitutionally prohibited end.
This is not to claim that courts have no basis on which to invalidate
firearms regulation beyond comprehensive handgun bans. Our point is that
the path toward an anti-targeting theme in Second Amendment doctrine is
logically challenging. And a substantial burden analysis would yield a
pattern of outcomes that it is not easy to predict. Our concern remains that,
however controversial the legal logic, courts will borrow an anti-targeting
theme from elsewhere in constitutional doctrine and then subject nearly all
gun control efforts to substantial judicial review. While we hold to our
sense that courts will not radically revise firearms law in the United States,
confirming that prediction of judicial modesty might happen only after
much litigation—and with an additional cost in the form of regulatory stasis.
E.

Judicial Review and Innovation

This brings us to a more diffuse yet equally troublesome risk of Second
Amendment litigation. The Supreme Court’s willingness to inject the
judiciary into the gun control arena could have a socially detrimental
dampening effect on regulatory innovation. This should be of concern to
anyone who believes that gun policy in America has come to an unfortunate
stalemate, and that the future might open political opportunities for novel
regulatory approaches that overcome current ideological cleavages and do
more good than harm.
Granted, constitutional law does not necessarily kill innovation. The
relationships among constitutionalism, judicial review, and regulatory
innovation are actually quite complex. One description of constitutional law
in the United States has emphasized entrenchment of old norms against
change, but many observers now recognize that a constitutional order can
generate institutions to make change.238 Judicial review is no different. It
might retard or instigate regulatory innovation, depending on how it is
performed. For example, nonjudicial policymakers might respond to
judicial invalidations with new regulatory approaches in an effort to respect
both judicial judgments and public demands. Roe v. Wade did not end the
238.
See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 153 (1995) (“The American Constitution is an instrument of government,
not an obstacle to government . . . .”); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 631, 662–63 (2008) (discussing
coordination theories of authority for our constitutional text). A provocative argument for valuing
constitutional debate precisely for its ability to combat entrenchment is LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN,
OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 55, 210–16 (2001). In this regard, consider that Heller itself effectively disrupted a status
quo in judicial review against Second Amendment claims.
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development of abortion law and Heller did not end the District of
Colombia’s gun control efforts.239 In addition, the very substance of
constitutional doctrine can mandate periodic updating in ordinary law. An
illustration is Eighth Amendment doctrine’s focus on evolving standards of
decency.240 We can imagine a Second Amendment doctrine that likewise
calls for evaluation of gun control according to contemporary values and
circumstances.
But the possibility of constitutional litigation certainly can deter novel
government responses to old or new social problems—and passages in
Heller seem crafted to have this dampening effect. Recall the majority’s
reliance on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources for guidance on the
Second Amendment’s meaning, its reference to a tradition of prohibiting
dangerous or unusual weapons, and its apparent preference for longstanding
gun control measures.241 Even if these forays into originalist history and
subsequent tradition leave readers uncertain about what counts as
unacceptable novelty in gun control, and even if some type of interest
balancing was operating in the background, the Court’s official rationale
looks largely unsympathetic to policy experimentation. At this point,
moreover, we cannot be certain that fighting comprehensive handgun bans
will exhaust judicial opposition to firearms regulation. There is now a
substantial range of plausible litigation threats while the Court’s position on
gun control remains vague. These threats can prevent policy experiments
before they begin.
It might be fair to ask whether the demand for innovative responses to
gun risks is appreciable in the current political environment. One might
believe that the policy rut is too deep for Second Amendment litigation
threats to make much difference. But we believe that policy innovation is
alive in some states and localities. Jurisdictions including California,
Maryland, and Massachusetts have moved forward with new gun control
policies in recent years.242
Relatively innovative ideas include
microstamping shell casings for the purpose of tracing crime guns,
reviewing the design of new guns before they hit the market, and
personalized gun technology that attempts to restrict usage to owners only.
Perhaps less mainstream but nevertheless intriguing is the possibility of
taxing firearms according to their estimated social costs, or requiring
firearms owners to maintain insurance to cover the costs of gun misuse by
themselves or others. Some such innovation might be analogized to existing
regulation of other commodities, but these ideas would be new with respect
239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra note 113.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2664–65 (2008).
See supra text accompanying notes 139–147.
See supra Part I.C.1–I.C.4.
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to firearms. A tradition-oriented Second Amendment doctrine would
undercut them.
Furthermore, the political environment for firearms regulation can
change. Opportunities for new policy rise and fall with such factors as
changing demographics and the salience of gun violence; if the decline in
sporting uses of guns continues to sap NRA membership efforts, if violent
crime spikes upward again, and if we witness another Virginia Tech-style
massacre, the politics will tend to change. But a tradition-enforcing form of
judicial review can minimize these regulatory opportunities. In fact, this
politically countercyclical role for judicial oversight helps explain the oddity
of 305 members of Congress supporting constitutional litigation against the
District of Columbia, rather than simply voting to override the District’s
regulations.243 Heller could help freeze some existing political victories on
the gun rights side, victories that kept gun control mild and that make Heller
look unimportant at the moment.
Heller might put a brake on new gun control policy through two
mechanisms. First, at least some proposals will be debated under a serious
threat of constitutional litigation with its attendant costs for the government.
These costs are not limited to financing an adequate legal defense; losing a
Second Amendment challenge might mean paying damages or attorneys
fees to the claimants. And litigation threats against innovative regulation
will remain strong unless and until Second Amendment doctrine is clarified
in relevant respects. Consider California’s cutting edge rule that, beginning
in 2010, semiautomatic pistols must be designed to stamp a serial number on
the shell casing each time a round is fired.244 Whether this requirement will
pass constitutional muster is not fully known at the moment, and the issue
may not be settled for many years. Meanwhile, legislators in other states
who are attracted to this idea as a boon to police investigations will have to
persuade the majority that it not only serves the public interest, but that it is
worth the expected cost of defending it in the courts. Even if microstamping
is somehow insulated from serious Second Amendment objections, in some
cases the expected litigation costs will be prohibitive.
The second mechanism is more speculative but it might be significant.
Heller transformed the notion of personalized Second Amendment rights
from contested to justiciable. The decision could therefore strengthen the
rhetorical arsenal of gun rights supporters, even if these advocates have
243.
See supra note 4. It is possible that the Senate’s commitment to supermajority votes for
cloture against filibusters led this simple majority of Congress members to prefer constitutional
litigation to ordinary legislation. If so, the shift to litigation is a consequence of the legislators’
own institutional design choices. On constitutional objections to the filibuster itself, see Adam M.
Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 608–09, 667–68 (2006).
244.
See supra note 83.
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gone beyond Heller’s language.245 It is hard to predict the political effect
that this shift will have in practice, but it may be nontrivial. The hopeful
view of gun control advocates, that Heller would open the door to moderate
legislation by undercutting the rhetorical force of the slippery slope
argument,246 is yet to be confirmed and might be naïve.247 On the other
hand, the case could ultimately have no meaningful effect on constitutional
argument outside the courts. Second Amendment objections to gun control
predate Heller by decades, and the movement behind those arguments helps
explain the decision rather than the other way around. In addition, Heller
demilitarized the amendment in a way that preserves key elements of
modern gun control. Thus if judicial rhetoric influences nonjudicial debate,
the influence might cut in two directions.
Even if Heller deters the implementation of some number of firearms
policies that are worth trying, there is nevertheless a modest hope for
improved policy quality in the regulation that does go forward. The
Supreme Court intervened late in the development of gun regulation in the
United States, and some might view the current system as dysfunctional.
The less respect one has for gun politics today, the more one might hope that
a dose of judicial oversight will prove net beneficial. The comparison is not
between uninformed judges redrafting firearms law and an ideal world of
policymaking in which people’s values are fairly ascertained while experts
collect relevant data which is then used to construct social welfare
maximizing regulation. In the United States, authority over firearms
regulation is often maintained within state legislatures responsive to the
distribution of organized political power, not in localities sensitive to local
conditions or administrative agencies building expertise on the potential and
limits of gun control. And if Second Amendment doctrine beyond the core
right recognized in Heller calls for sober consideration of rational argument
and empirical data, our current system of gun politics and regulation might
make progress toward sound policy.
But this hope is no more than modest. The first problem is that we
cannot guarantee that any improvement in policy quality will outweigh the
value of foregone policy experiments. It almost goes without saying that we
245.
See National Rifle Ass’n, Supreme Court Declares that the Second Amendment
Guarantees an Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms (June 26, 2008) (“All law-abiding
Americans have a fundamental, God-given right to defend themselves in their homes.
Washington, D.C. must now respect that right.”), available at http://www.nraila.org/heller/.
246.
See David M. Kennedy, Now Reason Can Prevail, NAT’L L.J., vol. 31, no. 4, at 27
(Sept. 22, 2008).
247.
Cf. Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rights, The Truth About the Heller Decision (July 29, 2008)
(exhorting supporters to fuel pro-gun lobbying efforts because “liberals are using [Heller] to
restrict our gun rights,” and criticizing the decision for recognizing longstanding prohibitions on
certain types of gun use), available at http://www.nationalgunrights.org/truthaboutheller.shtml.
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have more to learn about the characteristics of effective gun control that
adequately accounts for the benefits of gun ownership. Second, judges are,
at best, only marginally better at understanding the complexities of gun
policy analysis than others involved in the system. They are not experts and
they are unlikely to acquire the relevant expertise in short order, even if they
act in good faith. Whether judges are able to incorporate values held by the
general public rather than implement their own personal policy preferences
is another serious question, if the goal is social welfare maximization.
Finally, the post-Heller litigation environment is decidedly
asymmetrical. Gun rights proponents now have an additional method for
achieving their goals, while gun control proponents will ordinarily lack
conventional constitutional arguments to prompt gun regulation.
PNonjudicial politics ultimately preempted many lawsuits against the gun
industry, and now the Supreme Court has made it possible for the gun rights
movement to press further in the other direction with supreme judicial
review. To the extent that Second Amendment litigation prompts deeper
and empirically driven evaluation of firearms regulation, it will come with
gun control in a systematically defensive posture. We have little confidence
that this one-sided drag on policy innovation can produce sufficient gains to
provide a net benefit.
For some, an additional veto gate for gun control in the courtroom will
be a welcome change. But a libertarian presumption against government
action is not self-evidently good policy from a social welfare perspective.
And so we remain concerned that the greatest risk to sound public policy
following Heller is among the least visible: an additional background
pressure against novelty in the law of gun control at a time in which
experimentation and creative decisionmaking is crucial.

CONCLUSION
Heller begins a new era in the history of gun control. It adds federal
constitutional adjudication to the policymaking environment in a novel way,
without determining much of the future for Second Amendment doctrine.
We have attempted to understand the dimensions and underpinnings of the
decision, and to evaluate its plausible consequences for social welfare. That
perspective and the available data lead us to believe that some obvious
constitutional issues, such as the validity of nonfederal handgun bans and of
concealed carry laws, are not especially threatening. Yet other possible
outcomes, such as judicial skepticism of gun-targeted regulation that
increases firearms prices and litigation risks that chill regulatory innovation,
ought to be matters of serious concern. Our analysis is itself only a
beginning. But one important task after Heller is to separate true threats
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from sideshows in the continuing struggle to reduce crime and violence in
America.
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